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Are Limited Partnership Interests
Securities? A Different Conclusion
Under the California Limited
Partnership Act
"Under [California Law], a limited partner cannot maintain his
limited status and at the same time exercise managerial control over
the partnership... Accordingly, we conclude that the limited part-
nership interest offered.., was a security .... '"
In January of 1985, the California court of appeal in People v.
Graham2 considered whether a limited partnership3 interest was a
security.' In Graham, the defendant offered for sale limited partner-
ship interests in a chemical detoxification machine.' The issue was
whether the interests were subject to securities regulation.6 An answer
to this issue required analysis of whether limited partnerships are
1. People v. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1159, 1168-69, 210 Cal. Rptr. 318, 325 (1985).
2. 163 Cal. App. 3d 1159, 210 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1985).
3. A limited partnership is a partnership formed by two or more persons under a limited
partnership statute, which has one or more general partners and one or more limited partners
as members. H. HEN, LAWS OF CoRPoAoTIONs § 28, at 85 (1983); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
836 (5th ed. 1979). "An unincorporated association, or firm, in which one or more of the
partners are, on compliance with the provisions of various state statutes regulating such part-
nerships, relieved from liability beyond the amount of the capital contributed by them. A part-
nership formed by two or more persons under the provisions of the Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act, having as members one or more general partners and one or more limited partners.
The limited partners, as such, are not bound by the obligations of the partnership." Id.; UNiF.
LTD. PARaNERsrmi AcT § 1, 6 U.L.A. 562 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ULPA]; see also REVISED
UNIF. LTD. PARTRSmI ACT § 101(7), 6 U.L.A. 216 (Supp. 1986) [hereinafter cited as RULPA].
The limited partnership is a form of business which is similar to a corporation because of
limited liability, and similar to partnerships because of the tax treatment of the income of
the partnership. See A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSMP § 23B(K), at 136(1968). The federal income tax provisions relating to partnerships are set forth in the Internal
Revenue Code, §§ 701-761. Section 701 provides for "conduit" or "pass through" income
tax treatment: "A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax imposed by this
chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax only in their
separate or individual capacities." I.R.C. § 701 (1954).
4. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1164-74, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 322-29.
5. Id. at 1164, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
6. Whether an investment must be registered with the state under the securities regulation
provisions of the California Corporations Code requires a two-step analysis. CAL. CoRP. CODE§ 25110. The first issue is whether the investment is definable as a security. Id. § 25019. The
second issue is whether the investment is exempt from registration. Id. §§ 25100, 25102, 25103,
25105. This comment is concerned primarily with the first step of analysis for applying securities
regulation. See infra notes 42-197 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of a security).
See also infra notes 438-44 (discussing exemption provisions).
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securities.' The court initially stated that the limited partnership in-
terests were securities under appropriate circumstances.' Appropriate
circumstances exist when an investor places money at risk and expects
a benefit largely from the efforts of others. 9 The court concluded
that limited partnerships meet these requirements.'" As a result, the
court held that, by definition, a limited partnership interest meets the
appropriate circumstances and, therefore, is a security."
The Graham decision, however, was reached after California
enacted 2 a unique 3 version of the Revised Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act (RULPA).' 4 Unfortunately, application of securities
analysis using California's current limited partnership law is absent
from the Graham decision.15 The 1984 California version of the
RULPA and the 1985 ULPA 6 greatly expand a limited partner's right
7. See Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1164-69, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 322-25.
8. Id. at 1164-65, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
9. See id. at 1165-69, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 322-25.
10. Id. at 1169, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
11. Id.
12. The California version of RULPA is found at California Corporation Code §§
15611-15723. See also infra notes 323-58 and accompanying text.
13. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632. Two other states have similar statutes. See infra note
419 and accompanying text.
14. RULPA §§ 101-1105, supra note 3, at 215-83. See also HANDBOOK OF TiE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1982) [hereinafter cited as HAND-
BOOK] (explaining the purpose of the National Conference for drafting uniform laws).
The object of the National Conference, as stated in its consititution, is "to pro-
mote uniformity in state laws on all subjects where uniformity is deemed desirable
and practicable." The National Conference works through standing and special com-
mittees. In recent years proposals of subjects for legislation are referred to a standing
Committee on Scope and Program. After due investigation, and sometimes a hearing
of parties interested, this committee reports whether the subject is one upon which
it is desirable and feasible to draft a uniform law. If the National Conference decides
to take up the subject, it refers the same to a special committee with instructions
to develop a draft of an act. With respect to some of the more important acts, it
has been customary to employ an expert draftsman. Tenative drafts of acts are sub-
mitted from year to year and are read and discussed section by section. Each uniform
act is thus the reaction, and emendation of the Commissioners, who represent the
experience and judgment of a select body of lawyers chosen from every part of the
United States. When finally approved by the National Conference, the uniform acts
are recommended for general adoption throughout the jurisdiction of the United States
and are reported to the American Bar Association.
Id. at 347.
15. See 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1164-69, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 322-25.
16. The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act has been superseded by the 1985 Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, which was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners
in August 1985. See infra notes 299-322 and accompanying text. See also HANDBOOK, supra
note 14, at 346:
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is composed
of Commissioners from each of the states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.
In approximately one-third of these jurisdictions the Commissioners are appointed
by the chief executive acting under express legislative authority. In the other jurisdic-
tions the appointments are either made by general executive authority, or appointed
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to control the enterprise.' 7 The right of control changes the require-
ment that the limited partner be a passive investor.'" The limited part-
ner does not need to expect a return on investment solely from the
efforts of others.' 9 As a result, application of the current California
Corporations Code could cause a different result than reached by the
court in Graham."0
The California Corporations Code and the 1985 ULPA raise im-
portant questions about partnership interests being subjected to
securities regulation. The initial question to consider is which elements
will cause an investment to be defined as a security and, hence, be
subject to securities regulation. 2' Since limited partnership interests
are not specifically listed in federal and state securities statutes, the
interests may be securities if the definition of an investment contract
is met.22 The lack of control is an essential element of an investment
contract, which is defined as a security by federal securities regula-
tions.23 In applying the definition of a security to limited partner-
ships, the next question is whether a limited partner may participate
in control of the business enterprise.2" The ultimate question is whether
a limited partnership interest is subject to securities regulation through
the appropriate definition of a security. 2
Initially, this comment will consider federal and state statutory defini-
tions of securities.26 In addition, definitions of a security made by
the United States Supreme Court, 27 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals,2" and California" courts will be analyzed. The cases review-
ed will illustrate the crucial issue of "control" when deciding whether
an investment is a security.3"
by the legislature, or by some other means. There are usually four representatives
from each jurisidiction. The term of appointment varies. The Commissioners are chosen
from the legal profession, being lawyers and judges of standing and experience,
legislators and teachers of law in some of the leading law schools.
Id. See also infra notes 410-25 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 323-58 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 73, 323-58 & 377 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 323-58 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 391-408 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 79-197 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 97-197 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 258-358 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 359-408 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 79-138 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 139-66 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 167-97 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 79-197 and accompanying text.
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This comment will examine the history of general3' and limited
partnership32 law. The nuances of liability, liquidity, and control under
general and limited partnerships will be contrasted with those
characteristics in corporations.3 3 In addition, limited partnerships
formed under the California Corporations Code after 1984 and the
1985 ULPA will be analyzed.14 Changes in a limited partner's right
to control an enterprise will be emphasized. This comment will con-
clude that contrary to traditional notions about partnership law, limited
partners in California and states adopting the 1985 ULPA may now
participate in control of the enterprise without fully losing the pro-
tection of limited liability.3 5 In addition, this comment will conclude
that, contrary to traditional notions about securities law, some limited
partnership interests will not meet the definition of a security since
a limited partner may now participate in control of the enterprise
under current California law. 36 Therefore, determination of whether
the sale of a limited partnership interest is a security will have to
be made on a case by case basis. 7
Finally, this comment will examine the 1985 ULPA and the 1985
Uniform Securities Act. 8 The 1985 ULPA expands limited partner
control rights beyond current California partnership law.39 The 1985
Uniform Securities Act specifically includes limited partnership interests
in the definition of a security.40 This comment will conclude that
California should amend the Corporations Code to be consistent with
the 1985 ULPA and 1985 Uniform Securities Act.4 '
DEFINING A SECURITY
In order to determine whether a particular investment or financial
scheme is subject to securities regulation, attorneys should consider
31. See infra notes 201-55 and accompanying text; UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1), 6 U.L.A.
22 (1969) (a partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners
a business for profit) [hereinafter cited as UPA]. See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1009 (5th
ed. 1979). A general partnership is a partnership in which the parties carry on all their trade
and business for the joint benefit and profit of all the parties concerned. All the partners share
the profits, losses, and management equally. Id.
32. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; infra notes 258-358 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 212-358 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 323-58 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 323-58 & 410-25 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 391-408 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 358, 408 & 425 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 409-44 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 410-25 and accompanying text.
40. See infra note 426-44 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 423-44 and accompanying text.
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both the statutory definition of a security and the governmental goals
of security regulation. 2 Both factors are important because legislative
consideration of public policy goals often will control the judicial in-
terpretation of statutes. "3 Hence, investments not expressly included
in the statutory definition of a security will sometimes be included
through case law."
A. Philosophy and Goals of Regulation
Formal securities regulation began in 1911 when the Kansas
legislature enacted a statute regulating investment schemes marketed
within Kansas." This statute became known as a "blue sky" law
because the purpose of the statute was to protect Kansas farmers from
being sold a piece of the blue sky. 6 Other states followed by enacting
similar statutes. 7 Today all states have blue sky laws.48 In addition
to requiring the disclosure of information regarding the security, many
42. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 n.11 (1982). The Court stated:
It does not follow that a certificate of deposit or business agreement between trans-
acting parties invariably falls outside the definition of a "security" as defined by
the federal statutes. Each transaction must be analyzed and evaluated on the basis
of the content of the instruments in question, the purposes intended to be served,
and the factual setting as a whole.
Id.
43. See id. at 558-59. The Supreme Court held that a bank certificate of deposit is not
a security. Recognizing that certificate of deposit owners in federally regulated banks are pro-
tected by federal banking laws and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Court stated:
The definition of "security" in the 1934 Act provides that an instrument which
seems to fall within the broad sweep of the act is not to be considered a security
if the context otherwise requires. It is unnecessary to subject issuers of bank cer-
tificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under
the federal banking laws. We therefore hold that the certificate of deposit purchased
by the Weavers is not a security.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848
(1975). The Court held that the stocks sold by the defendant were not securities. The Court stated:
We reject at the outset any suggestion that the present transaction, evidenced by
the sale of shares called "stock," must be considered a security transaction simply
because the statutory definition of a security includes the words "any ... stock."
Rather we adhere to the basic principle that has guided all the Court's decisions
in this area:
[I]n searching for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act[s], form
should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality.
Id. (footnote omitted, brackets in original) (quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336
(1967)). See also infra notes 120-38 (discussing Forman and Marine Bank).
44. See infra notes 79-197 and accompanying text.
45. See T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2, at 6 (1985).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See generally L. Loss, COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT (1976); H.
SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH, BLUE SKY LEGISLATION (1977).
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blue sky laws demand that the security qualify on a merit basis.49
State merit laws require that the security pass minimum state stan-
dards of quality.5" The purpose of the merit test is to protect the
investor by authorizing only securities that have a predetermined degree
of merit.5 '
Despite the enactment of numerous blue sky laws, securities fraud
persisted throughout the United States.52 During the two decades
following enactment of the Kansas statute, the United States Con-
gress resisted federal legislation regulating securities." Fraudulent
securities practices, however, may have helped precipitate the stock
market crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression.14 Consequently, Con-
gress recognized the need for federal regulation of securities and passed
the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)." The 1933 Act, also known
as the Truth in Securities Act, was directed primarily at the initial
distribution of securities." To achieve the goal of investor protec-
49. See W. PAINTER, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN BUSINESS PLANNING 602 (1975) (the
philosophy of many states is that there are some offerings against which the investor needs
to be protected whether or not the facts have been disclosed). But cf. Campbell, An Open
Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. LAW 553-79 (1985) (discussion
on whether blue sky merit laws provide protection for investors); Brandi, Security Practitioners
and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of Comments and Rating of States by Stringency of Regulation,
10 J. CORP. L. 689-710 (Spring 1985).
50. See Painter, supra note 49, at 602 (citing Illinois law, which gives the Secretary of
State power to refuse registration of securities if there are "conditions affecting the soundness
of the security so that the sale would be inequitable, or would work or tend to work a fraud
or deceit"); see also A. CONRAD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE § 22 (1976); cf. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25140 (requiring the transaction to be "fair, just and equitable"). "The state blue
sky laws frequently empowered the state commissioner not only to require information, but
to forbid the issuance of securities that appeared to be unsound." A. CONRAD, supra, § 22, at 42.
51. See T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at 6.
52. Id.
53. Id. See Carney, Defining a Security: The Addition of a Market-Oriented Contextual
Approach to Investment Contract Analysis, 33 EMORY L.J. 311, 352 (1984). "Congress did
not believe that markets for information about securities were a total failure. Congress might
have felt that the costs of mandatory disclosure were far greater than the possible benefits
from such disclosure." Id. at 352. The markets for information referred to means information
about companies demanded by investors. Id. at 347.
54. T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at 6. See also Carney, supra note 53, at 348 (whether cor-
rectly or incorrectly, Congress saw the crash of the securities market as a cause rather than
an effect of the Great Depression).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1982). See also infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
56. See T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at 6-7. See also H. HENN, supra note 3, at 797 (the
Securities Act of 1933 deals mainly with the initial distribution of securities by the issuer rather
than with subsequent trading of securities by the owner). See also Message from the President,
77 CONG. REC. 937 (1933).
I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal supervision of traffic in in-
vestment securities in interstate commerce.
In spite of many State statutes the public in the past has sustained severe losses
through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons and cor-
porations selling securities.
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which
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tion, Congress eschewed the merit requirements of blue sky laws."
Instead, Congress opted for a policy of full disclosure."8 The theory
behind the 1933 Act was that investors were protected adequately if
all significant aspects of the securities being offered were disclosed
fully and fairly.59 During legislative debate, proponents of the 1933
Act argued that full disclosure would place the owners of securities
on parity with management of the corporations."' By possessing the
same information available to management, investors can avoid
fraudulent schemes.
Despite the significance of the 1933 Act, some commentators argued
that the Act did not protect investors effectively.' After initial pur-
chase of the security, investors had no knowledge of the operations
of the enterprise.6 2 Consequently, Congress passed the Securities
might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound
in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they
represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new securities
to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and infor-
mation, and that no essentially important element attending the issue shall be con-
cealed from the buying public.
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine, "Let
the seller also beware." It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller.
It should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public
confidence.
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the least possible
interference to honest business.
This is but one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors.
It should be followed by legislation relating to the better supervision of the purchase
and sale of all property dealt in on exchanges, and by legislation to correct unethical
and unsafe practices on the part of officers and directors of banks and other
corporations.
What we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of the ancient truth that those
who manage banks, corporations, and other agencies handling or using other people's
money are trustees acting for others.
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
The White House, March 29, 1933,
Id.
57. T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at 7.
58. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REOULATION 35 (1983).
59. See T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at 7. See also W. PAINTER, supra note 49, at 602.
60. L. Loss, supra note 58, at 36 (quoting Representative Rayburn: "The purpose of this
bill is to place the owners of securities on a parity, so far as is possible, with the management
of the corporations, and to place the buyer on the same plane so far as available information
is concerned, with the seller." (footnote omitted)).
61. Id. at 33 (quoting Professor William 0. Douglas: "Mhose needing investment guidance
will receive small comfort from the balance sheets, contracts, or compilation of other data
revealed in the registration statement. They either lack the training or intelligence to assimilate
them and find them useful, or are so concerned with a speculative profit as to consider them
irrelevant.").
62. See generally W. CARNEY, supra note 53, at 334-54.
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Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).63 The 1934 Act increased investor
protection by requiring periodic disclosure of all relevant informa-
tion to investors." Thus, after the 1934 Act, investors were entitled
not only to material information at the time of initial distribution,
but also similar information throughout the life of the enterprise.6 1
The continuous disclosure required by the 1934 Act has been recognized
as significantly more beneficial to the shareholder than the initial
disclosure requirements under the 1933 Act. 66
The main premise of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts is that investors
need information in order to make competent investment decisions. 67
Regulation through full disclosure laws has two inherent assumptions.
First, investors have the right to make investment decisions without
approval from the government.68 An investor should be free to be
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78-78kk (1982). The 1934 Act also created the Securities and Exchange
Commision and included severe antifraud provisions. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78r, 78ff (1982).
64. See T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at 7. See also Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283
F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
"It has been held that . . . the purpose of the Securities Exchange Act is to protect the inno-
cent investor, as distinguished from one who loses his innocence and waits to see how his
investment turns out before he decides to invoke the act. . . ." Id. at 428.
65. See T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at 238. "Section 13(a)(2) of the Exchange Act requires
all issuers of equity securities subject to section 12's registration requirements to file annual
and quarterly reports. . . ." Id. (footnotes omitted); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1982).
66. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcuarmas LAW HADBOOK § 5.02, at 41 (1986). See also T.
HAZEN, supra note 45, at 7.
67. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
68. See Federal Securities Act, 1933: Hearing Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce House of Representatitves on H.R. 4314, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1933) (statement
of Hon. Huston Thompson, Attorney at Law, Washington, D.C.).
And, furthermore, the Government says to them: We are not taking into considera-
tion the extremely speculative nature of this stock. What we are trying to do is to
put you on an equal basis, or as nearly as possible on an equal basis, with the seller.
Then it is up to you. If you want to take the speculative risk, all right.
Id. at 40.
MR. WOLVERTON. You say the only thing you can do is inform the purchaser.
You mean under the provisions of this bill?
MR. THOMPSON. Under the provisions of this bill, we can compel the issuer,
the seller, to do that.
MR. WOLVERTON. The bill could be drawn to go further than that, could it
not, so more security could be given to the purchaser than the mere right to issue
the stock now?
MR. THOMPSON. If you do that, you are getting over into a phase that is covered
by the State blue sky laws. We have tried to keep away from that and have tried
to follow the English method and the German method. The great duty that we have
to perform or that the Government will have to perform is to, as far as possible,
acquaint the purchaser with the speculative phase of the transaction.
MR. WOLVERTON. Then the theory upon which this bill is drawn is not to pre-
vent the issuance of worthless stock, but merely to give such facts as will enable
a purchaser to recognize it as worthless stock?
MR. THOMPSON. I think that is pretty near it.
MR. WOLVERTON. If there is a duty on the part of our Government to give
information to a purchaser that stock is worthless, why would it not be a duty of
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prudent or reckless.69 The investor, however, is entitled to informa-
tion necessary to make that decision.7" The second assumption is that,
without full disclosure, the investor normally lacks the information
necessary to buy, hold, or sell an investment.7 Requiring disclosure
of information about the enterprise also assumes the investor does
not have control of the enterprise, since investor control would pro-
vide the needed information to make decisions. 72 An investor not
possessing the right to control the enterprise is defined as a passive
investor. 7" Therefore, the fundamental goals of both the 1933 and
1934 Acts is to provide passive investors with information about the
the Government to stop that stock from going out just the same as you would stop
any other fraud from being carried on?
MR. THOMPSON. If you do that, you begin to get into the question of what
is speculative and what is not speculative, and that is a very difficult sphere to pick up.
Id. at 53.
MR. PETTENGILL. In other words, if a man wants to invest money in a pro-
position to make gold out of sea water, we do not want to stop it.
MR. THOMPSON. I should think that is true.
MR. PETTENGILL. As long as he knows what he is putting his money into and
wants to take the risk.
MR. THOMPSON. Yes.
Id. at 58.
69. See L. Loss, supra note 58, at 35 ("At the same time the law should not try to keep
investors from making bad bargains.. . ."); Id. at 36. "In short, Congress did not take away
from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a fool of himself.' It simply attempted to pre-
vent others from making a fool of him." Id.
70. See 77 CONG. REC. 2910, 2918 (1933) (statement of Rep. Rayburn). "Those who are
interested in purchasing these pieces of paper have the right to demand information as to the
actual condition of the issuing company." Id.
71. Id. at 2916.
As corporations became older, as their founders died, as their operations became
more extensive, as they came to demand increasing and frequent additions of capital,
their stockholders ceased to be a few fellow adventurers known to each other and
became a multitude. The relations between the stockholder and the corporation
ceased to be personal and became impersonal.
Id.
[T]oday the owner of shares in a corporation possesses a mere symbol of ownership,
while the power, the responsibility, and the substance which have characterized owner-
ship in the past have been transferred to a separate group which holds control. It
is for the protection of these 18 million owners of symbols that this bill has been drawn.
Id. at 2918. "The average stockholder cannot tell much about the condition of his company
from the statements he receives. The inquiring investor has been able to get little except blurbs."
Id. See also id. at 2982 (1933) (statement of Sen. Fletcher). "People have been persuaded to
invest their money in securities without any information respecting them, except the adver-
tisements put forth by the agents or representatives of those issuing the securites, and such
advertisements have not given full information to the public." Id.
72. See id. at 2918 (1933) (statement by Rep. Rayburn). "We have, on the one hand,
18,000,000 passive citizens having no actual contact with their companies; on the other hand,
a few hundred powerful managers directing and controlling the destinies of the companies and
the physical properties which they own." Id. See also Frazier v. Manson, 651 F.2d 1078, 1080
(5th Cir. 1981) ("an investor does not need the extensive protection of the federal securities
laws when he or she has partial control of an enterprise").
73. 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcurnr-ss AND FEDERAL CoRPoRATE LAW . 2.12 (1985).
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enterprise that is available to those persons actively controlling the
business.74
By enacting the 1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress recognized the need
for securities regulation and decided upon a regulatory policy of full
disclosure. Having decided how to protect the investor, Congress next
had to decide which investments should be subject to regulation.
Examination of the statutory language of the 1933 and 1934 Acts
is a necessary step in defining a security.
B. Statutory Definition
In the 1933 Act Congress listed the types of investments subject
to federal regulation. Section 2 of the 1933 Act states:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, invest-
ment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, or, in general any interest or instrument commonly known
as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 7
Although the 1933 and 1934 Acts differ slightly in their definitions
of securities, the Acts have been interpreted as being essentially iden-
tical.76 Consequently, nearly all opinions involving securities begin with
the definition found in the 1933 Act. 77 Since the 1933 Act specifically
74. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982). Consistent with the philosophy of protecting investors
who lack necessary investment information, Congress established exemptions to the registration
requirements. Section 3(b), known as the "small issue" exemption, exempts securities issues
when the aggregate value of the offering does not exceed $5,000,000. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1982).
Pursuant to § 3(b), the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Regulation A. 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.264 (1985). Regulation D exempts offerings of any amount to accredited
investors and offerings under $5,000,000 if the investors are nonaccredited. Id. §§ 230.501-.506
(1985). Rule 506 exempts offerings regardless of dollar amount, when no more than 35 non-
accredited persons purchase the shares from the issuer. Id. § 230.506 (1985). See also H. HENN,
supra note 3, at 799-805. See also infra note 439 and accompanying text.
76. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967). In addition to the items listed
in the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act includes "any oil, gas or other mineral royalty or lease," rather
than the 1933 Act's "fractional undivided interest in oil, gas or other mineral rights." The
1934 Act exludes from the list "currency or any note, draft bill of exchange, or bankers accep-
tance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive
of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited." See 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(I0) (1982).
77. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2302 (1985); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556 (1979); United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
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states what constitutes a security, the remaining question is whether
an investment not listed in the Act could also be a security. The judicial
definition of securities has developed primarily from the statutory
phrase "investment contracts. ' 78
C. Judicial Interpretation
1. The Supreme Court
In S.E.C. v. Joiner Leasing Corp.,79 the United States Supreme
Court struggled with the definition of a security found in the 1933
Act. 0 Joiner Leasing involved the public sale of oil leases.8" The defen-
dant promoters marketed the leaseholds through a mass mailing cam-
paign to prospects throughout the country. 2 The SEC sought an in-
junction against further sales because the defendant promoters failed
to register the investment with the SEC. 3
The Court was confronted with the issue of whether an investment
could be subject to securities regulation if the investment was not
specifically included in the 1933 Act definition of a security. ' The
Court recognized that state courts had given liberal construction to
blue sky laws in order to prevent and punish fraudulent sales of
securities.8 5 The Court felt the 1933 Act should be given a similar
liberal interpretation. 6 Consequently, the Court relied on the prac-
tical goals of the 1933 Act to analyze the issue.8 7 The Court con-
cluded that novel or uncommon investment devices were subject to
the 1933 Act if the devices were similar to investment contracts or
to any interest commonly knowrn as a security. 8 The rationale was
that if an investment is similiar to a security as defined by the 1933
Act, the goals supporting regulation bring the investment within the
section 2 definition of a security.8 9 For example, an investment pro-
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 (1975); S.E.C. v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297 (1946); S.E.C.
v. Glenn Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1973); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust
& Say. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 595 F. Supp. 800, 806 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Hirsch
v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1977).
78. See T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at 15.
79. 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
80. Id. at 350-51.
81. Id. at 346.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 345.
84. Id. at 348-55.
85. Id. at 353.
86. Id. at 353-54.
87. Id. at 349.
88. Id. at 351.
89. Id.
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ven functionally similar to a stock will be defined as a security
regardless of the label given by the promoter. 9
In Joiner Leasing, the defendant promoters utilized mass marketing
to reach investors who had no prior business association with the defen-
dants. 9' Therefore, informal access to investment information did not
exist.92 Additionally, the prospective investors would not take part
in management. 93 The Court found the Joiner Leasing investment offer
was the type of scheme from which investors need protection through
full disclosure. 94 As a result, the Court held that the oil leases fit
within the remedial purposes of the 1933 Act and therefore, were
securities. 95 The Joiner Leasing Court, however, did not establish a
test that could be utilized by other courts faced with the same issue. 91
Three years after Joiner Leasing, the Supreme Court enunciated
the first definition of an "investment contract" in S.E.C. v. Howey
Co.97 The case involved the public sale of subdivided citrus groves. 98
Offers were made throughout the country. 99 Each investor purchased
an average of 1.33 acres.' 0 The purchases included a service contract
with Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc.'0 ' This company would plant,
harvest, and market the crops.' 0 2 The net profit would be distributed
to the investors.'0 3 As with Joiner Leasing, the Court was confronted
with an investment that was not expressly included in the 1933 Act.'0 4
The Court framed the issue as being whether the land sales contract,
the warranty deed, and the service contract together constituted an
investment contract within the meaning of section 2(1) of the 1933
Act. 105
The Court in Howey stressed the importance of broad construc-
tion of the 1933 Act to afford the investing public a full measure
90. Id. at 352-53.
91. Joiner Leasing, 320 U.S. at 346.
92. Informal access to information means that the investors lacked valuable information
about the venture because they had no prior association with the promoters or their enterprise.
Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(0(2).
93. See 320 U.S. at 346.
94. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
95. 320 U.S. at 351.
96. See Long, Partnership, Limited Partnership, and Joint Venture Interests as Securities,
37 Mo. L. REv. 581, 598 (1972).
97. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
98. Id. at 294-95.
99. Id. at 299-300.
100. Id. at 295.
101. Id. at 295-96.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 296.
104. Id. at 297.
105. Id.
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of protection. ° 6 Additionally, the Court stated that form should be
disregarded in favor of substance, and that economic reality should
be considered. 0 7 The Court reasoned that the actual mechanics of
the investment are controlling, not the label applied by promoters.',"
With this premise, the Court held that an investment contract is a
contract, transaction, or scheme whereby money is invested in a com-
mon enterprise and the investor is led to expect profits solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.'0 9 As applied to the facts
of Howey, investors contributed money to a common enterprise in
which profits were anticipated. Since most investors would not farm
the citrus acreage," 0 or participate in management of the enterprise,"'
the Court concluded the expected return on investment was based solely
on the efforts of others.1
2
The Court in Howey viewed the new definition as a fullfillment
of congressional intent and an embodiment of a flexible rather than
a static principle." 3 Although forty years have passed since the Howey
decision, the Howey definition of an investment contract and the sup-
porting rationale of the case remain the beginning point of security
analysis involving investment contracts.
' 4
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the Howey
definition, an additional factor has been discussed by the Court. The
inability of investors to inspect products and verify company or
106. Id. at 298.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 300. See also Slevin v. Pedersen Assocs., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 437, 440 (S.D.N.Y.
1982). In deciding whether an investment is an investment contract security, Judge Duffy applied
an economic realities analysis and remarked: "A lizard with a sign around its neck reading
'dog' does not change the lizard into a Labrador retriever." Id. Cf. In re Deborah C., 30
Cal. 3d 125, 141, 635 P.2d 446, 455, 177 Cal. Rptr. 852, 861 (1981) (Mosk, J., concurring)
(Speaking on an entirely different subject than securities, Justice Mosk stated "I would invoke
the folk wisdom that if an object looks like a duck, walks like a duck and quacks like a
duck, it is likely to be a duck.").
109. 328 U.S. at 298-99. The holding became known as the Howey test. The test has four
elements for finding an investment contract: (1) Investment of money, (2) presence of a com-
mon enterprise, (3) expectation of profits, and (4) the profits will result soley from the efforts
of others. Id.
110. Id. at 300.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 299.
114. See Deacon & Prendergast, Defining a "Security" After the Forman Decision, 11 PAc.
L.J. 213, 217-18 (1980). "[I1n evaluating investment contract securities under Section 2(l) of
the Securities Act, the Howey test becomes the accepted methodology." Id. at 217. See also
United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (the Howey test embodies the essen-
tial attributes that permeate all the Court's decisions defining a security); see also Carney, supra
note 53, at 320 (with minor changes, the Howey test has dominated the definitional approach
to investment contract analysis).
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promoter representations has been considered by the Court since Joiner
Leasing."' The Court has expressed this concern by discussing the
plan of distribution of an investment."I6 In Joiner Leasing, the Court
noted that sales literature was sent to over one thousand prospective
investors." 7 The Court stated that a security may be identified by
the plan of distribution," 8 which includes whether the scheme was
offered to a wide range of investors." 9
The Supreme Court in two recent decisions has opined that the
absence of widespread solicitation could negate the application of
securities law. In United Housing Foundation v. Forman,I" the Court
held that shares of stock in a nonprofit housing cooperative were not
securities.' 2' To acquire an apartment in the housing development a
purchaser was required to buy eighteen shares of Riverbay stock for
twenty-five dollars per share, for each room.'22 The stock was not
transferable, could not appreciate in value, and did not pay
dividends." 3 The court stated that the primary purpose of the 1933
and 1934 Acts was to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated
market. 24 The focus of both acts was the capital market of the enter-
prise system.' 25 The Court implied that since the inducement was merely
to acquire subsidized "living space,"'' 26 the investment was not the
type that was likely to be widely traded on the securities exchanges
or elsewhere. 27
In Marine Bank v. Weaver,' 28 the Court strengthened the inference
in Forman29 that the plan of distribution is a factor to consider. 30
In Marine Bank, a couple purchased a $50,000 certificate of deposit
from a bank."' The certificate then was pledged to the same bank
115. See Carney, supra note 53, at 355.
116. See Rapp, The Role of Promotional Characteristics in Determining the Existence of
a Security, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 26, 31 (1981) (the presence of promotional characteristics in find-
ing a security is unmistakable).
117. Joiner Leasing, 320 U.S. at 346.
118. Id. at 353.
119. See id. at 351.
120. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
121. Id. at 859-60.
122. Id. at 842.
123. Id. at 851.
124. Id. at 849.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 851.
127. See id. at 849.
128. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
129. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
130. See Carney, supra note 53, at 356.
131. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 552.
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to guarantee a $65,000 loan by the bank to a third party.' 32 In exchange
for the guarantee, the certificate owner received an agreement from
the third party that entitled the certificate owners to fifty percent of
the third party's business and one-hundred dollars per month for the
balance of the loan guarantee. 133 The Court held the certificate of
deposit and third party agreement were not securities. 3 The Court
stated the unusual instruments held to be securities in prior cases in-
volved offers to many potential investors, rather than a private trans-
action as in the case before the court. 35 The Court also noted that
the investments in Howey and Joiner Leasing clearly were not private
transactions. 
36
Although the Forman and Marine Bank decisions have yet to be
formulated into a concise test, an inference may be drawn that the
courts should examine the surrounding circumstances closely to deter-
mine whether the investor needs protection through securities regula-
tion. 37 One of the circumstances courts should consider is the plan
of distribution.'38 Since the Supreme Court is a court of last resort,
opportunities to refine the law are more likely at the appellate level.
Thirteen years ago the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refined the
Howey test.
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Howey decision has resulted in controversy and criticism.'39
The use of the word "solely" by the Court when describing the in-
vestor's reliance on the efforts of others resulted in confusion among
132. Id. at 553.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 560.
135. Id. at 559.
136. See id. at 559-60.
137. See Carney, supra note 53, at 356-57.
138. Id. at 355-57.
139. See Long, supra note 96, at 601 (cases since 1967 show a growing dissatisfaction with
the Howey test since the court failed to make clear in Howey what type of efforts it meant).
See also Comment, Recent Ninth Circuit Developments in Securities Law, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REv.
985 (1980).
Many critics contended that the courts had created an arbitrary definition of invest-
ment contract that had become rigid and fixed through judicial interpretation, and
had failed to expand with the financial schemes of the day. It soon became readily
apparent that some modifications in the application of the test would be required
if the test were to remain a useful tool in defining securities.
Id. at 988; see also Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security". Is There a More Mean-
ingful Formula?, 18 CAsE W. Rrs. L. Rav. 367 (1967) (courts were dissatisfied with the Howey
test).
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the lower courts.' ° Courts in subsequent cases disagreed whether
"solely" should be construed strictly or broadly.,
In S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc.,' 2 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals specifically considered the meaning of the word
"solely." Glenn Turner involved a pyramid sales scheme'43 in which
self-improvement contracts were offered to buyers who then could
sell contracts to other buyers and receive a commission.144 After pay-
ing an initial investment, the buyer was obligated to find other pro-
spective buyers to bring to the sales meetings. 45 In Glenn Turner,
the defendants were officers, directors, and employees of the defen-
dant corporation. 46 The defendants argued if the "solely from the
efforts of others" criterion from Howey were applied, the investment
could not be a security.'417 The investor could only obtain a profit
through personal efforts. 48 The Court recognized the word "solely"
as the only question to be resolved in Glenn Turner since all the other
prongs of the Howey test had been met. 49 The court emphasized
economic reality and substance over form in holding the word "sole-
140. See generally State Comm'r of Sec. v. Hawaii Mkt. Center, Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 108(Hawaii 1971) (stating that "courts become entrapped in polemics over the meaning of the
word 'solely').
141. Id. See also Long, supra note 96, at 602.
142. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
143. A pyramid sales scheme is a "device, illegal in many states, in which a buyer of goods
is promised a payment for each additional buyer procured by him." BLACK's LAW DIcTioNARY
1113 (5th ed. 1979).
144. 474 F.2d 478-79.
145. The court described these sales meetings as follows:
These meetings are like an old time revival meeting, but directed toward the joys
of making easy money rather than salvation. Their purpose is to convince prospec-
tive purchasers, or "prospects," that Dare is a sure route to great riches. At the
meetings are employees, officers, and speakers from Dare, as well as purchasers (now
"salesmen") and their prospects. The Dare people, not the purchaser-"salesman,"
run the meetings and do the selling. They exude great enthusiasm, cheering and
chanting; there is exuberant handshaking, standing on the chairs, shouting, and
"money-humming." The Dare people dress in expensive, modem clothes; they display
large sums of cash, flaunting it to those present, and even at times throwing it about;
they drive new and expensive automobiles, which are conspicuously parked in large
numbers outside the meeting place. Dare speakers describe, usually in a frenzied man-
ner, the wealth that awaits the prospects if they will purchase one of the plans. Films
are shown, usually involving the "rags-to-riches" story of Dare founder Glenn W.
Turner. The goal of all of this is to persuade the prospect to purchase a plan.
• ..After the meeting, pressure is applied to the prospect by Dare people, in an
effort to induce him to purchase one of the Adventures or plans. The sale is sometimes
closed by the purchaser who brought the prospect to the meeting, but primarily,
by Dare salesmen, specialists in the "hard sell."
Id. at 479 (footnotes omitted).
146. Id. at 477-78.
147. See id. at 481-82.
148. Id. at 482.
149. Id. at 181.
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ly" should not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the defini-
tion of an investment contract.' 0
By abandoning literal interpretation of the word solely,' 5' the court
adopted an "expanded efforts" test. This test involves whether the
efforts made by those other than the investor are undeniably signifi-
cant and are essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or
success of the enterprise. 5 2 The court in Glenn Turner emphasized
the significance of the presence or absence of investor control when
deciding if an investment scheme is a security.' The court recog-
nized that if the Howey test is applied strictly, the fundamental goals
of investor protection can be circumvented.' 5 Requiring a modicum
of effort from the investor would mean that the investor no longer
has to rely solely on the efforts of others for a profit and, therefore,
the investment.would not meet the Howey test of a security.' 55 For
example, requiring investors to stuff envelopes once a year for the
business might be enough effort to fall outside the Howey definition
of an investment contract. 156 This strict interpretation, however, would
be contrary to the spirit of both Joiner Leasing'" and Howey.
58
Therefore, recognizing the economic realities of the pyramid scheme
in Glenn Turner, the court used a managerial test.'5 9 As applied to
the facts in Glenn Turner, the Court held that providing a business
with prospects is not an essential managerial effort by the investor.
161
The application of the managerial test in Glenn Turner reemphasizes
the philosophy and goals of Congress in enactment of 1933 and 1934
Acts. '6' If an investor possesses the right to perform essential managerial
150. Id. at 481-82.
151. See Rapp, supra note 116, at 38.
152. 474 F.2d at 482.
153. Id. at 481-83.
154. Id. See also Long, supra note 96, at 601; Arnold, "When Is a Car a Bicycle?" and
Other Riddles: The Definition of a Security Under the Federal Securities Laws, 33 CLEV. ST.
L. REv. 449, 452 (1985); Comment, Is a Limited Partnership Interest a "Security?": The Cur-
rent State of the California and Federal Definitions Add a Legal Dimension to Economic Specula-
tion, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 311, 332 (1976).
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
156. Cf. Gallion v. Alabama Mkt. Centers, Inc., 282 Ala. 679, 213 So. 2d 841 (1968) (distribu-
tion of 100 cards to potential customers of a membership-only discount department store was
sufficient to fail the Howey test); Georgia Mkt. Centers v. Forston, 225 Ga. 854, 171 S.E.
2d 620 (1969) (distribution of cards to potential customers of a membership-only discount depart-
ment store was sufficient to fail the Howey test). See also Comment, Catch-All Investment
Contracts: The Economic Realities Otherwise Require, 14 CuM. L. Rav. 135, 150-53 (1984).
157. See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
159. 474 F.2d at 482 ("those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success
of the enterprise").
160. Id. at 482-83.
161. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
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duties that affect the failure or success of the enterprise, the invest-
ment is not merely an investment contract. 162 This type of investor
does not need protection of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.' 63 Since the in-
vestor can protect an investment through personal efforts and access
to information, full disclosure requirements are superfluous.' 64 The
Glenn Turner modification of the Howey test has not yet been
approved by the United States Supreme Court,' 6 despite the large
number of courts following the decision. 166
Unlike the federal courts, some state courts took a different
approach in deciding if an investment, contract, or scheme was a
security. Unfortunately, state court definitions can be more ambiguous
than the federal court decisions. In California, two tests have been
applied to decide if investments not mentioned in the applicable statute
are securities. 167
3. California
In People v. Syde, 68 the Supreme Court of California applied a
"participation" test to state securities analysis.' 69 The Syde case in-
volved contracts between Milton Syde Films, Inc. and parents of
various child actors. 70 The contracts required down payments of fif-
teen dollars and five dollars per rehearsal until ninety-eight dollars
was paid.' 7 ' The contracts also provided that upon sale of the film
sixty percent of the gross receipts would be distributed equally to the
162. Glenn Turner, 474 F.2d at 482.
163. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
164. Id.
165. However, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the holding in Glenn Turner. See United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975). The Court stated:
This test speaks in terms of "profits to come solely from the efforts of others."
(Emphasis supplied). Although the issue is not presented in this case, we note that
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that "the word 'solely' should
not be read as a strict or literal limitation on the definition of an investment con-
tract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include within the definition
those schemes which involve in substance, if not form, securities." We express no
view, however, as to the holding of this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
166. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Goldfield Deep Mines Co., 758 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985); S.E.C.
v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); Miller v. Central Chinchilla Group,
Inc., 494 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1974); Securities Adm'r v. College Assistance Plan, Inc., 533 F.
Supp. 118 (D. Guam 1981), aff'd, 700 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1983).
167. Comment, Limited Partnerships and the California Securities Law: Restricting the Public
Sale of Limited Partnership Interests, 13 U.C.D. L. REv. 618, 624 (1980).
168. 37 Cal. 2d 765, 235 P.2d 601 (1951).
169. Id. at 769, 235 P.2d at 603.
170. Id. at 766-67, 235 P.2d at 602.
171. Id. at 767.
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cast members.' The court concluded the film could not be produced
without the actual participation of the cast members.' 73 By holding
that the contracts with the parents were not securities, the court stated
that securities law was not intended to regulate investments in which
persons expect to reap a profit from active participation in a business
venture.' 74 One commentator has argued that the court in Syde essen-
tially applied the elements of the Howey test, although Howey was
not cited.'
In Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 7" the California Supreme
Court interpreted the California statutory definition of a security.'
77
Silver Hills involved the sale of memberships in a country club under
development.' 78 The memberships were offered to the public and pro-
ceeds were used for acquiring the necessary property. 79  The court
held the memberships were securities and emphasized that state
securities laws were designed to protect the public against spurious
schemes devised to attract risk capital. 8" Furthermore, the court held
the purpose of the law was "to afford those who risk their capital
at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legitimate yen-
172. Id.
173. Id. at 769, 235 P.2d at 603.
174. Id.
175. 2 H. BALLANTiNE & G. STEtLNG, CALIFORNIA CORPORATON LAws § 444.02 (1985);
see also Deacon & Prendergast, supra note 114, at 222 (citing Syde, the authors state that
California has adopted the Howey test). See also People v. Davenport, 13 Cal. 2d 681, 687,
91 P.2d 892, 895-96 (1939). While explaining the meaning of "securities," the California Supreme
Court in Davenport stated "It means the investment of funds in a designated portion of the
assets and captial of a concern, with a view of receiving a profit through the efforts of others
than the investor, and in this sense includes what are termed 'security' or 'investment' con-
tracts or 'speculative securities."' (emphasis by the court). Id. The Davenport case is particularly
interesting because it predates Howey.
176. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
177. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (defines "security" as "any note; stock; treasury stock;
membership in an incorporated or unincorporated association; bond; debenture; evidence of
indebtedness; certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement; collateral
trust certificate; preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable share; investment con-
tract; voting trust certificate; certificate of deposit for a security; certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in an oil, gas or mining title or lease or in payments out of production under such
a title or lease; put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit,
or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof);
or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency; any beneficial interest or other security issued in connection with
a funded employees' pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, or similar benefit plan; or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.").
178. 55 Cal. 2d at 812-13, 361 P.2d at 906-07, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
179. Id. at 812, 361 P.2d at 906-07, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
180. Id. at 814, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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tures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form
or another.'" I'
The amorphous definition'12 of a security stated by the California
Supreme Court is known as the risk capital test.' 3 The risk capital
approach permits the finding of a security if capital is sought to be
risked in the initiation of a business venture.'84 Unlike the Howey
test, however, an investor is not required to have an expectation of
receiving a monetary profit from the investment.' s Thus, the court
in Silver Hills found a security when the benefit sought was country
club memberships rather than financial gain.'"6
The risk capital test creates problems, however, because the test
focuses on the risk of the investment. The investor's ability to con-
trol the enterprise through active participation is not expressly rele-
vant.' 7 As a result, a venture in which the investor participated in
management in addition to risking capital could still be defined as
a security. This result does not appear consistent with the philosophy
of protecting only passive investors. Yet, thirteen years later, a Califor-
nia court of appeal redeclared the risk capital test to be the law in
California.' 8 Some commentators have argued that this declaration
is incorrect.' 9
Lower courts in California eventually ignored the risk capital test
and applied the Howey test. In 1978, the court in People v. Park90
held the Howey decision as the applicable test in security analysis.' 9'
The court also cited Glenn Turner for the proposition that the in-
181. Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
182. See Comment, supra note 154, at 322 (the risk capital test provides uncertain guidance
for identification of a security); see also Hirsch v. duPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214, 1222 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (stating under the risk capital test "virtually every conceivable investment, including the
general partnership interests in the present case, would qualify as securities.").
183. See Deacon & Prendergast, supra note 114, at 220. The risk capital standard was first
employed by the California Supreme Court in Sobieski. Id.
184. H. BALLNE & 0. SmRuNa, supra note 175, § 444.02, at 21-19.
185. Id. at 21-20.
186. 55 Cal. 2d at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 909, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
187. See T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at 23; H. Ballantine, supra note 175, at § 444.02.
188. See Hamilton Jewelers v. Department of Corps., 37 Cal. App. 3d 330, 335, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 387, 390 (1974). "Thus California follows the 'risk capital' approach in ascertaining whether
a transaction involves a 'security' within the meaning of the Corporate Securities Law." Id.
(citation omitted).
189. Deacon & Prendergast, supra note 114, at 222. But see Comment, supra note 154,
at 320. "The major test used by California courts to define 'security' is commonly referred
to as the 'risk capital test."' Id.
190. 87 Cal. App. 3d 550, 151 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1984).
191. Id. at 563, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 152. "Under widely accepted judicial interpretation and
definition, an investment contract for the purposes of securities laws means a contract, transac-
tion or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." Id.
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vestor's power to control the enterprise is a crucial issue in deciding
whether an investment is a security. 92 Similarly, in People v. Coster,'93
another California court of appeal held the Howey test applicable
to both federal and California securities law. 194 Finally, the court in
People v. Graham'" also applied the Howey test with the Glenn Turner
modification. The court stated that the holding has the effect of merg-
ing elements of both the Howey test and the risk capital test.' 96 Ad-
ditionally, like the court in Glenn Turner, the court found that resolv-
ing the right of control issue was an essential element of security
analysis. 97
The California Supreme Court, however, has yet to merge the
Howey and risk capital tests. Most refinement of securities analysis
has occured at the trial and appellate court levels. Consequently, securi-
ty analysis in California is currently unsettled. Before any applica-
tion of security tests to limited partnerships can be analyzed, an ex-
amination of the nature of partnership interests must be made.
PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
To fully understand the characteristics of a limited partnership, a
distinction should be made between general partners and limited part-
ners. Two reasons exist for making this distinction. First, the distinc-
tion illustrates the type of investor attracted by various forms of
business. This distinction identifies the relationship between the in-
vestor and management, which becomes crucial when analyzing
securities.' 98 The second reason for the comparison is to determine
how rights and liabilities of general and limited partners compare to
those of corporate shareholders, who are readily recognized as own-
ing securities.' 99 If an investment is similar to corporate stock, then
the policies supporting securities regulation of stocks should also apply
to the investment. Therefore, similarity, or dissimilarity to corporate
stock alters the established need for securities regulation through full
disclosure."'
192. Id.; see S.E.C. v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
193. 151 Cal. App. 3d 1188, 199 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1984).
194. Id. at 1193, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
195. 163 Cal. App. 3d 1159, 210 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1985). See also supra notes 1-11 and
accompanying text.
196. Graham, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 1168, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
197. Id. at 1168, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 325.
198. See supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (treatment of a stock).
200. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text (discussing policy of protecting passive
investors such as stockholders).
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A. General Partnerships
Partnerships are as old as cooperative activity."0 ' Partnerships can
be traced from Babylonian sharecropping through Greek and Roman
trading enterprises of the Renaissance.20 2 The partnership form of
business organization was established as an informal method of con-
ducting business. Informality was a natural requirement due to the
personal relationship between the partners."' This type of relation-
ship was also a natural result of the partners' direct involvement in
the venture. All partners were involved in the enterprise because com-
bining financial, material, and managerial resources was the basis for
developing a partnership. 204 Through early Mercantile Courts, England
accepted the partnership form, designated as Societas. °0 As the law
developed, England eventually passed the Partnership Act of 1890.206
In 1914, drafting of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) was com-
pleted in the United States. 2 7 Though subject to some variations, the
UPA has been adopted by nearly all jurisdictions in the United
States.20 8 Consistent with commmon law development, however, the
partnership remains the simplest form of business association for two
or more persons. Under the UPA, a partnership can be created by
an oral agreement, 20 9 generally does not require a filing with the
state,210 and may be dissolved by any of the partners. 2 ' In addition
to these basic principles of partnership law, the following three fac-
tors should be analyzed to distinguish this business organization from
others: liability, transferability, and control.
201. See generally A. BROMBERO, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 10 (1968); R.
HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 41-44 (1981).
202. See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 201, at 10; R. HAMILTON, supra note 201,
at 41-44.
203. See C. RoHLicH, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BusINESS ENTERPRISES § 2.03[2],
at 2-13 (5th ed. 1975 & Supp. 1985) (the partnership relation is personal and consensual). See
also Long, supra note 96, at 586 (partnership relations are usually spawned by an acquain-
tanceship or business association).
204. 1 WEST'S SymBIoLEoGRAPHY § 27 (1590).
It may be that the one (partner) only conferreth the goods, and the other no goods,
but bestoweth only his and diligence, which then is instead of goods. For labor is
oftentimes of as good regard as money, yea, and sometimes much better, which causeth
that even the poor being industrious, may have fellowship with the rich.
Id.
205. See generally A. Bromberg, supra note 201, at 10-13.
206. Id.
207. See generally Commissioner's Prefatory Note, UPA, supra note 31, at 5-8.
208. Table of Jurisdictions, UPA, supra note 31, at 1-2 (Supp. 1986) (only Louisiana is
not listed).
209. See H. HENN, supra note 3, at 66.
210. Id. at 67.
211. UPA § 31(1), supra note 31, at 376.
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1. Liability
In accordance with principles of agency law,2"2 each partner is liable
for the actions of the other partners.21 3 Liability exists whether those
actions are based upon actual or apparent authority.2 ' Unlimited
liability is well established under principles of common law. 215 By
statute, if the partnership assets cannot satisfy a claim by tort vic-
tims or creditors, a partner's personal assets are available to satisfy
partnership obligations. 21 6 Consequently, since actions by one part-
ner can greatly affect the personal assets of another partner, a per-
sonal relationship of trust generally exists before the formation of
a partnership or admittance of a new partner. 21 7 Additionally, with
the risk of unlimited liability, a general partner demands control of
the enterprise to guard against financial ruin.2"8
The treatment of liability for general partners is in sharp contrast
to corporate shareholder liability, which is limited to the initial in-
vestment. 219 Limitations on liability allow shareholders to be more
concerned about investment performance, rather than potential liability.
Consequently, the corporate shareholder is less concerned about
possessing a right to control the enterprise. In addition to limited liabili-
ty, limitations on transferability distinguish partnerships from other
business organizations.
2. Transferability
The rights of a partner are generally nontransferable. 2 ° Under the
doctrine of delectus personae,22' a person cannot be made a partner
212. See H. HENN, supra note 3, at 66.
213. UPA § 4(3), supra note 31, at 16.
214. See id. § 9, at 132.
215. See C. BATES, 1 LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 475-506 (1888).
216. See UPA § 15, supra note 31, at 174.
217. See R. JENNINoS & R. BUXaAUm, CORPORATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 17 (1979).
"The mutual agency relation of the partners is so personal, and carries the potential for such
far-reaching consequences to each partner because of the unlimited liability of each for part-
nership debts, that any change in the originally-constituted group ends the relationship." Id.
See also Long, supra note 96, at 586 (stating partnership relationships "are usually spawned
by an acquaintanceship or business association that allows each of the prospective partners
to observe the talents and shortcomings of the others. Thus, the traditional partnership was
a relationship of mutual respect and trust.").
218. See R. POSNER, EcONomc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.2, at 291 (2d ed. 1977) (since each
partner is personally liable for the debts of the partnership, a prospective investor will want
to participate in the actual management of the firm to make sure the firm does not incur
large debts).
219. H. HENN, supra note 3, at 130-31.
220. Id. at 76.
221. Literally translated, delectus personae means choice of the person. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 383 (5th ed. 1979). "By this term is understood the right of a partner to exercise
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without unanimous consent of the partners.222 The doctrine of delec-
tus personae is logical because partners are liable for the actions of
new partners. 23 Therefore, existing partners must choose very carefully
the prospective partners since these partners could have a large im-
pact on the partners' personal finances. Although partners are free
to sell partnership interests, not all partnership rights vest in the
assignee.22 The assignee may not vote on partnership matters or other-
wise participate in control of the enterprise. 2 5 Essentially, the assignee's
rights are limited to receipt of profits and the right to request an
accounting.226 These provisions force the partnership to attract in-
vestors willing to forego liquidity.227 A reduction in liquidity increases
the risk to the investor, due to an inability to limit losses through
sale of the investment. 228 To offset the increased risk, an investor
is likely to want some right to control the enterprise. 2 9 Relatively
few investors, however, have the time and talent to protect investments
through active participation in management of the business. The prac-
his choice and preference as to the admission of any new members to the firm, and as to
the persons to be so admitted, if any." Id.
222. H. HENN, supra note 3, at 76.
223. See 1 J. BARRETT & E. SEAGO, PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS LAW AND TAXATION §
2.1 (1956) (the doctrine is the very cornerstone of the partnership relationship).
Logically one can fully understand the reason for this doctrine if he will but con-
template the full scope of the legal effects of the partnership relation. Lord Kenyon
has said, "When a man enters into a partnership he certainly commits his dearest
rights to the discretion of everyone who forms a part of that partnership in which
he engages .. "
Id. (quoting Wells v. Masterman, 2 Esp. 731 (1799)).
224. H. HENN, supra note 3, at 76.
225. Id. See also UPA § 27(l), supra note 31, at 353. An asssignee may, however, vote
on partnership matters and participate in management if the partners have consented in the
partnership agreement. Id.
226. Id.
227. Liquidity is defined as "the status or condition of a person or a business in terms
of his or its ability to convert assets into cash." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (5th ed. 1979);
See also Van Camp, Securities Regulation of Real Estate Investments. The California Model,
35 Omno ST. L.J. 309, 311 (1974). "[A] partnership investment generally lacks liquidity, perhaps
the single most important feature of a corporate security. In the usual case a partnership in-
vestment cannot be readily and conveniently converted to cash through the sale or transfer
of the partnership interest." Id.
228. R. POSNER, supra note 218, at 291 (a reduction in liquidity places the investor at the
mercy of the partners). See also F. REILLY, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS & PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
17-18 (1979).
The greater the uncertainty regarding whether the investment can be bought or sold
or the greater the price concession required to buy or sell it, the greater the liquidity
risk. An example of an asset with almost no liquidity risk would be a United States
Government Treasury Bill. A treasury bill can be bought or sold in minutes at a
price almost identical to the quoted price. Purchase or conversion into cash is almost
instantaneous and the price is known with almost perfect certainty.
Id.
229. See R. POSNER, supra note 218, at 291.
1986 / Limited Partnerships as Securities
tical effect of these compensating factors is a reduction in the value
of public solicitation.23 This reduction reemphasizes the close rela-
tionship between partners that is necessary for organizing a part-
nerhsip.23'
Corporate shareholders, alternatively, may transfer interests freely232
with all rights vesting in the assignee. 233 Millions of corporate shares
are transferred daily through regional and national stock exchanges. 3
Unlike a partnership investment, approval from the other shareholders
is not necessary. 2 " Liquidity is enhanced because the seller does not
have to find a buyer willing to purchase an investment with unlimited
liability. Consequently, the shareholder is less likely to be interested
in controlling the enterprise.236 In addition to limited liability and
transferability, rights of control distinguish partnerships from other
forms of business.
3. Rights of Control
Unless otherwise stated in the partnership agreement, all partners
have equal rights to control and manage the partnership. 237 The right
of control ranges from making day to day operational decisions to
amending the partnership agreement. 23 This fundamental right is a
significant reason for choosing a partnership as the enterprise form.239
In addition, the right to control the business is a counter balance
to unlimited personal liability and lack of liquidity.24'
In contrast, shareholders of a corporation are usually not involved
230. Public solicitation is a factor considered by the courts when applying regulatory pro-
tection through full disclosure laws. See supra notes 117-37 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 203 & 217 and accompanying text.
232. See Van Camp, supra note 227, at 311 (liquidity is the single most important feature
of a corporate security). See also H. HENm, supra note 3, at 757. Transferability may be limited
pursuant to a contract between shareholders and the corporation. Id. As a practical matter,
however, large corporations seldom restrict share transfer in order to maintain the market-
ability of the stock. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 175, at § 60.01(1).
233. Transferability is, however, subject to any restrictions placed in the bylaws or articles
of incorporation. See generally H. HENN, supra note 3, at 451.
234. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 507 (105th ed. 1985) (the New York
Stock Exchange traded an average of 85.3 million shares per day in 1983).
235. See H. HENN, supra note 3, at 451.
236. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
237. A partnership agreement is an agreement of the partners concerning the affairs of
the partnership and the conduct of its business. See RULPA § 101, supra note 3, at 216.
See generally H. HEN, supra note 3, at 70-72 (all partners have an equal right to manage).
238. See H. HENN, supra note 3, at 70-72.
239. Cf. Estate of Foreman, 269 Cal. App. 2d 180, 189, 74 Cal. Rptr. 699, 706 (1969).
"Some degree of participation by partners in management and control of the business is one
of the primary elements of partnership." Id. (citations omitted).
240. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
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in the operational aspects of the enterprise.2 ' Shareholders do not
possess a fundamental right to engage in managerial control.242 Con-
trol of the business is generally limited to the right to elect and release
members of the board of directors. 243 The directors are in turn respon-
sible for supervising corporate officers.244
The exception to noninvolvement by corporate shareholders is found
in closely held corporations. A closely held corporation may be a very
large business entity and yet not exceed the statutory limit of thirty-
five shareholders.245 In closely held corporations, the shareholders are
often personally involved in management of the enterprise.2 6 Despite
this exception, as a general rule, a corporate business form is more
amenable to attracting passive investors.24 7
In conclusion, differences in liability, liquidity, and management
distinguish one form of business from another. Partners sacrifice
liquidity and limited liability in exchange for participation in manage-
ment of the business. 2 8 Since most investors do not have time to
avoid liability through active control, public offers of partnership in-
terests would yield few investors. 249 Thus, public solicitation is of little
value to the partnership form of business. 211 In addition, since a partner
241. H. HENN, supra note 3, at 490-92. See also L. RIBsTEIN, BUSINESS AssoCIATos §
1.04 (1983) (unlike partners, corporate shareholders generally are passive owners, not co-equal
managers).
242. See H. HENN, supra note 3, at 490-92.
243. See generally L. Rnmasm, supra note 241, at § 104 (stating "the day-to-day manage-
ment of the corporation is left to the directors, while shareholders merely approve or disap-
prove of certain of the directors' decisions.").
244. See generally H. HENN, supra note 3, at 564.
245. See id. at 694-95.
246. Id. at 696. See also Berger, Statutory Close or Closely-Held Corporations, II PAC.
L.J. 699, 699-700 (1980).
The kind of corporation referred to generically as "close," "closely held" or
"closed" typically possesses the following characteristics:
(1) the shareholders are few in number, often only two or three;
(2) they usually live in the same geographical area, know each other, and are well
acquainted with each other's buiness skills;
(3) all or most of the shareholders are active in the business, usually serving as
directors or officers or as key men in some managerial capacity; and
(4) there is no established market for the corporate stock, the shares not being
listed on a stock exchange or actively dealt in by brokers; little or no trading takes
place in the shares.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
247. See R. POSNER, supra note 218, at 301.
248. See supra notes 213-29 and accompanying text.
249. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 201, at 126. "It is normally impracticable to market
widely a non-corporate ownership interest because of the liability potential it carries." Id. See
also supra note 230 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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is normally involved actively in business operations, the possibility
of defrauding the partner is lessened.
251
In contrast, the corporate shareholder has significant liquidity2 2 and
no risk beyond the initial investment.253 In addition, involvement in
management is limited to the appointment of directors. 254 As a result
of this arrangement, the shareholder is more passive in relation to
the enterprise than a partner in a partnership.255 Therefore, legislators
have recognized a greater need to protect the corporate investor through
regulation that requires full disclosure and provides remedies for fraud.
A general partnership is a form of business that predominantly
attracts investors desiring personal involvement in the partnership.256
Corporations, predominantly attract passive investors.257 A detailed
examination of limited partnerships will answer questions regarding
whether an investor in a limited partnership is allowed active par-
ticipation in management.
B. Limited Partnerships
1. History and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
Despite the existence of partnerships as a business form, a need
arose for an association permitting capital investment without manage-
ment responsibilities or financial liability beyond the amount invested.258
From inception, the fundamental principles behind this form of
business enterprise were limited liability and noninvolvement by the
investor.259 In 1822, New York enacted the first U.S. statute permit-
ting the organization of a similar noncorporate enterprise.2 60 The statute
designated this business organization a "limited partnership. ' ' 26'
Following the novel legislation of New York, other states enacted
251. Self protection through managerial control reduces the need for governmental protec-
tion. See supra notes 150-64 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
257. See R. POSNER, supra note 218, at 292, 301; H. HENN, supra note 3, at 490-92.
258. J. CRANE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PARTNERsHIP 113 (1952).
259. Id. The "commenda" satisfied the need for another business form during the middle
ages. The commendator supplied money to commendatarius to finance trade. In return, the
commendator received a majority of the profits. Additionally, the commendator could not be
held accountable for losses exceeding the capital invested. This type of business association
was statutorily recognized as "en commandite" in the French Commercial Code of 1807. Id.
260. Comment, The Limited Partnership, 45 YALE L.J. 895, 895-96 (1936).
261. Id. at 896.
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similar statutes.262 These laws generally provided that a limited part-
ner must contribute cash, file a partnership certificate, amend any
false statements in the certificate, and renew the certificate when ex-
piration occurs.263 In addition to technical formalities, the statutes
generally provided a limitation on limited partner participation to
business record inspections and consultation with the general part-
ner.26  Any further interference would result in general partner
classification. 265
When the early statutes were enacted, the prevailing viewpoint was
that investors who enjoyed profits of a successful enterprise also should
share losses upon failure. 266 This viewpoint made the courts uncom-
fortable with the limited partnership privileges created by the
legislature. 267 Consequently, these statutes received strict interpreta-
tion.268 Strict interpretation by the courts resulted in a loss of limited
partnership status for any deviations from the statutory provisions,
despite proper formation of the limited partnership. 269 The environ-
ment of strict interpretation threatened the attractiveness and con-
tinued use of limited partnerships. 270
To correct problems associated with limited partnerships, 27 the
262. Id. See also Basile, Limited Liability for Limited Partners: An Argument for the Aboli-
tion of the Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1199, 1202 (1985) (stating "[w]ithin the following
60 years, all the states adopted limited partnership acts based generally on the New York model.").
263. See Comment, supra note 260, at 897-98.
264. Id. at 898.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 896.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 899.
270. Id.
271. See Basile, supra note 262, at 1202-03. Drafters of the early statutes made no attempt
to define the type of conduct that would constitute interference by the limited partner. Conse-
quently early cases were mixed. Limited partner liability was not found in Madison County
Bank v. Gould, 5 Hill 309, 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (title to real estate was taken in the
name of two general partners and a limited partner, but the evidence did not show that the
limited partner participated in the conveyance or knew that he was named as a grantee in
the deed); Lawson v. Wilmer, 3 Phila. 122, 15 Leg. Int. 133, 133 (Phila. Common Pl. 1858)
and Outcalt & Co. v. Burnet & Brother, I Handy 404, 405 (Ohio 1855) (a limited partner
conducted the sale of partnership assets after dissolution); Lachaise v. Marks, 4 E.D. Smith
610, 619 (N.Y. Common PL. 1855) (a limited partner agreed to the proposed terms of the
partnership's dissolution); McKnight v. Ratclift, 44 Pa. 156, 162-63 (1863) (a limited partner
purchased goods from and sold goods to the partnership and performed an occasional errand
for the partnership); Ulman & Co. v. Briggs, Payne & Co., 32 La. Ann. 655, 662 (1880) (a
limited partner on one occasion "consulted with one of the general partners" and telegraphed
persons who requested information about the partnership to the effect that the firm was "all
right"). For cases in which limited partners were liable, see Richardson v. Hogg, 38 Pa. 153,
156 (1861) (the partnership agreement provided that the partnership was to employ a son of
the limited partner as a bookkeeper and that the general partner could not sign notes, checks,
or contracts on behalf of the partnership without the bookkeeper's approval); Farnsworth v.
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Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) was drafted in 1916,272 two
years after the Uniform Partnership Act. 2" Despite the overall clarity
of the ULPA, provisions dealing with a limited partner's ability to
participate in management without incurring general liability were
vague.2 74 A limited partner could inspect the partnership books275 and
force a dissolution by court decree.276 Beyond these two privileges,
few rights were articulated.277 Section 7 of the ULPA, however, pro-
vided that a limited partner becomes liable as a general partner "when
in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited part-
ner, he takes part in control of the business. 278 Unfortunately, the
term "control" was never defined by the ULPA. Thus, a major con-
troversy regarding limited partnership liability law began. 79 Courts
faced with the question whether a limited partner should be liable
for the obligations of the partnership had to decide if a limited part-
ner's involvement had become too extensive.28 0 Two California cases
illustrate the subtle distinctions in court analysis of control by limited
partners.
In Holzman v. de Escamilla,2 8' a limited partnership engaged in
the business of growing vegetables. 8 2 The business consisted of one
general partner and two limited partners.2 83 The three partners always
conferred regarding which crops to plant.284  The limited partners
sometimes dictated the choice of crops over the dissent of the general
partner. 285 The partnership maintained two bank accounts upon which
checks could be drawn with the signature of two partners.2 86 Therefore,
the general partner could draw a check only with the signature of
a limited partner. 2 7 Finally, the limited partners replaced the general
Boardman, 131 Mass. 115, 120 (1881) (a limited partner was a party to a contract transferring
all the assets of an insolvent partnership to a creditor and made a contract with the creditor
regarding disposal of the assets and payment of the partnership's debts); Strang v. Thomas,
114 Wis. 599, 601, 91 N.W. 237, 238 (1902) (a partnership agreement provided that the business
of the partnership would be managed by directors elected by the limited partners).
272. See Comment, supra note 260, at 899.
273. See supra notes 206-57 and accompanying tekt.
274. See Comment, supra note 260, at 902.
275. ULPA § 10, supra note 3, at 590.
276. Id.
277. See id.
278. Id. at 582.
279. See generally Comment, supra note 260, at 902-07.
280. Basile, supra note 262, at 1205-06.
281. 86 Cal. App. 2d 858, 195 P.2d 833 (1948).
282. Id. at 859, 195 P.2d at 833-34.
283. Id. at 833.
284. Id. at 834.
285. Id. at 860, 195 P.2d at 834.
286. Id.
287. Id.
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partner with a new general partner.28 Based upon these facts, the
court held the circumstances clearly showed that the limited partners
took part in control of the partnership.
289
In Grainger v. Antoyan,290 a California court considered the status
of a limited partnership engaged in the business of selling
automobiles. 29' The partnership consisted of one general partner and
two limited partners. 292 The limited partner defendant was the sales
manager of the limited partnership and was in charge of the new
car sales department.2 93 Additionally, the limited partner was authorized
to cosign checks drawn on the checking account of the partnership
in addition to the general partner and employees. 29" The limited part-
ner, however, only cosigned checks when the general partner was not
available.295 The limited partner had no authority to maintain the part-
nership books, extend credit to customers, set prices, hire or fire
employees, or purchase new cars. 296 On these facts, the California
Supreme Court held the limited partner's actions did not result in
a loss of limited partner status.2 97 The court stated that the case was
distinguishable from Holzman because in that case the limited part-
ner exercised control over the enterprise. 98
Cases like Holtzman and Grainger illustrate the problems confronted
by courts in deciding the issue of control under the ULPA. These
cases also demonstrate that under the ULPA, one or two actions by
the limited partner can result in a loss of limited partner status. As
will be seen, despite subsequent drafting and amending of the uniform
laws, the issue of control remains unsettled.
2. The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act
Sixty years after ULPA, the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership
Act (RULPA) was drafted to modernize the prior uniform law. 299
As of January 1, 1986, thirty states had adopted RULPA.3 °° To com-
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. 48 Cal. 2d 805, 313 P.2d 848 (1957).
291. Id. at 807, 313 P.2d at 849.
292. Id. at 806-07.




297. Id. at 813, 313 P.2d at 853.
298. Id.
299. See Prefatory Note, RULPA, supra note 3, at 202.
300. See Table of Jurisdictions, RULPA, supra note 3, at 201 (states adopting the RULPA
are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Iowa,
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pare limited partnerships under RULPA with general partnerships and
corporate shareholders, the factors of liability, liquidity, and control
again must be considered.
Liability of limited partners is confined to the amount of the in-
vestor's original investment.301 Should tort judgments or creditor obliga-
tions exceed the assets of the limited partnership, debts may be satisfied
only with assets of the general partner." 2 Limited liability historically0 3
and modernly0' is the fundamental basis for this form of business. 05
The liability of limited partners is similar to corporate shareholders30 6
and unlike general partnership interests. 30 7
In contrast to a general partner, a limited partner may assign the
interest without approval of the other partners. 0 The assignment pro-
vision increases the liquidity of a limited partnership interest. 30 9 By
agreement, partners may limit the right to assign the interest, but as
a practical matter, the general partner is concerned more with the
limited partner's capital than managerial contribution. 3 0 As a result,
a change in limited partners is unimportant to the general partner.
Therefore, the transferability rights generally will not be proscribed
in the partnership agreement, in order to enhance the attractiveness
of the investments. 31'
With regard to the issue of control, the RULPA expanded the rights
of limited partners by creating certain "safe harbors. ' 312 Safe harbors
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
301. See H. HENN, supra note 3, at 93.
302. Id.
303. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
304. H. HENN, supra note 3, at 93.
305. Id. See also R. JENNINGS, supra note 217, at 33; L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 241, at §
2.03; Basile, supra note 262, at 1199.
306. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
308. H. HENN, supra note 3, at 94.
309. See id. See also supra note 220-28 and accompanying text.
310. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 218, at § 14.2 (partnerships and sole proprietorships seek
contributions of labor, while corporations seek capital contributions).
311. See id.
312. RULPA § 303(b) & (c), supra note 3, at 241.
A limited partner does not participate in the control of the business within the
meaning of subsection (a) solely by doing one or more of the following: (1) being
a contractor for or an agent or employee of the limited partnership or of a general
partner; (2) consulting with and advising a general partner with respect to the business
of the limited partnership; (3) acting as surety for the limited partnership; (4) approving
or disapproving an amendment to the partnership agreement; or (5) voting on one
or more of the following matters: (i) the dissolution and winding up of the limited
partnership; (ii) the sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, pledge, or other transfer of all
or substantially all of the assets of the limited partnership other than in the ordinary
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are activities in which the limited partner may engage without incurr-
ing general partner liability. 3 3 One significant safe harbor provision
is the right of limited partners to remove the general partner.3'4 This
right is similar to the right conferred upon corporate shareholders
and indirectly involves the limited partner in controlling the enterprise.
In addition to safe harbors, the RULPA gives an expanded defini-
tion of the type of control that results in liability for limited partners
beyond initial investment. 315 The RULPA states if the limited partner
engages in control of the enterprise which is not substantially similar
to the control exercised by a general partner, the limited partner is
liable only to those who transact business with the partnership with
actual knowledge of the limited partner's control." ' The RULPA im-
plies that if a limited partner engages in conduct substantially similar
to a general partner, the limited partner will lose the limited liability
and be treated as a general partner. 31 7 Hence, under the RULPA,
a limited partner cannot participate in managerial control of the enter-
prise. Except for the safe harbor provisions, which allow some con-
trol, a limited partner is a passive investor. 318
In exchange for the relinquishment of managerial control, the limited
partner receives limited 319 liability and greater liquidity than a general
partner.32 This treatment is strikingly similar to that of a corporate
course of its business; (iii) the incurrence of indebtedness by the limited partnership
other than in the ordinary course of its business; (iv) a change in the nature of the
business; or (v) the removal of a general partner. (c) The enumeration in subsection
(b) does not mean that the possession or exercise of any other powers by a limited
partner constitutes participation by him in the business of the limited partnership.
Id.
313. See Basile, supra note 262, at 1212 (safe harbors are activities in which a limited part-
ner may engage without being deemed to have participated in the control of the business).
314. RULPA § 303(b)(5)(v), supra note 3, at 241.
315. Id.
316. Id. Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 303(a) states:
Except as provided in subsection (d), a limited partner is not liable for the obliga-
tions of a limited partnership unless he is also a general partner or, in addition to
the exercise of his rights and powers as limited partner, he takes part in the control
of the business. However, if the limited partner's participation in the control of the
business is not substantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general part-
ner, he is liable only to persons who transact business with the limited partnership
with actual knowledge of his participation in control.
Id.
317. Unfortunately the "substantially similar" test presents the same interpretive problems
as § 7 of the ULPA. See Basile, supra note 262, at 1213 (the commissioners have created
a new concept without providing any guidance for judges and lawyers regarding the meaning
of that concept).
318. Id. at 1212-13.
319. See A. BROMBERO, supra note 201, at 147 (stating "limited partners are exempt from
personal liability on condition they do not participate in management.").
320. See supra notes 308-09 and accompanying text.
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shareholder.32' As a result, public policy reasons for protecting cor-
porate shareholders should also apply to limited partnerships formed
under the RULPA.322 An understanding of the RULPA, as adopted
by California, is necessary before applying substantive partnership law
to securities analysis.
3. The California Corporations Code
The RULPA became effective in California in July of 1984.323 The
RULPA was adopted as part of the California Corporations Code
(California Code).324 Section 15632 of the California Code, however,
is a unique provision. Although the RULPA greatly extended allowable
limited partner involvement in the enterprise, the California Code
exceeded even that standard.325
The extension of limited partner involvement is partly a result of
an expansion of the RULPA safe harbor provisions.326 Like the
RULPA, the California provisions allow the limited partner to be
a contractor, agent, or employee of the general partner;327 consult
with the general partner;32 act as a surety to the limited partner-
ship;329 approve or disapprove an amendment to the partnership agree-
ment;330 and vote on dissolution and winding up of the limited part-
nership,33' the transfer of all or substantially all limited partnership
assets,332 incurrance of debt,333 change in the nature of the business,33"
and the removal of the general partner.335 In addition to the RULPA
safe harbors, the California Code explicitly allows a limited partner
to be an officer, director, or shareholder of a corporate general part-
ner; 336 vote on transactions when the general partner may have a con-
321. See Comment, A Tax Comparison of the Limited Partnership and the Subchapter S
Corporation, 43 MINN. L. REv. 964, 967 (1959) ("In many respects the status of a limited
partner is similar to that of a corporate stockholder .... .
322. See supra notes 42-164 and accompanying text.
323. See generally Review of Selected 1983 California Legislation, 15 PAC. L.J. 411, 482
(1984).
324. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15611-15723.
325. See infra notes 326-53 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 312-14 and accompanying text.
327. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632(b)(1).
328. Id. § 15632(b)(2).
329. Id. § 15632(b)(3).
330. Id. § 15632(b)(4).
331. Id. § 15632(b)(5)(A).
332. Id. § 15632(b)(5)(B).
333. Id. § 15632(b)(5)(C).
334. Id. § 15632(b)(5)(D).
335. Id. § 15632(b)(5)(F).
336. Id. § 15632(b)(1).
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flict of interest,337 to continue the business,338 admission of a general
partner,3 9 to continue the business of a limited partnership after a
general partner ceases to be a general partner," ' to wind up the part-
nership;3 ' to file certificates of amendment or dissolution;3 42 to serve
on an audit committee or perform the functions of an audit commit-
tee. ' 3 These additional safe harbor provisions are illustrative of the
increased control rights of a limited partner under the California Code.
In addition to the safe harbor provisions, section 16532(a) of the
California Code further expands permissible involvement by a limited
partner. The first sentence is essentially the same as section 7 of the
ULPA34  and section 303 of the RULPA. 3 1 The second sentence of
section 15632(a), however, is significantly different than the second
sentence of the RULPA section 303.346 The California Code states:
If a limited partner participates in the control of the business without
being named as a general partner, that partner is nevertheless not
liable to persons who transact business with the limited partnership
unless they do so with actual knowledge of the partner's participa-
tion in control and reasonably believing that partner to be a general
partner.3 4 7
Stated differently, if a limited partner participates in control of the
enterprise the partner will not be liable unless the person seeking lia-
bility has (1) transacted business with the partnership, (2) had actual
knowledge of the limited partner's control at the time of the trans-
action, and (3) reasonably believed the limited partner was a general
337. Id. § 15632(b)(1)(E).
338. Id. § 15632(b)(1)(G). Implied in the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act. See
RULPA § 801(3), supra note 3, at 262.
339. Ca. CORP. CODE § 15632(b)(1)(H). Implied in the Revised Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act. See RULPA § 401, supra note 3, at 246.
340. CAL. CoRP: CODE § 15632(b)(l)(J). Implied in the Revised Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act. See RULPA § 801(3), supra note 3, at 262.
341. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632(b)(6).
342. Id. § 15632(b)(7).
343. Id. § 15632(b)(8).
344. "A limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition
to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of
the business." ULPA § 7, supra note 3, at 582.
345. "Except as provided in subsection (d), a limited partner is not liable for the obliga-
tions of a limited partnership unless he is also a general partner or, in addition to the exercise
of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business."
RULPA § 303(a), supra note 3, at 241.
346. "However, if the limited partner's participation in the control of the business is not
substantially the same as the exercise of the powers of a general partner, he is liable only
to persons who transact business with the limited partnership with actual knowledge of his
participation in control." RULPA § 303(a), supra note 3, at 241.
347. CA. CORP. CODE § 15632(a).
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partner.34 8 This language of the California Code significantly varies
from the RULPA. One commentator has concluded that California
confines a limited partner's liability to reliance creditors and tort
victims.349
Thus, under the California Code a limited partner can participate
fully in management, while retaining significant protection from lia-
bility.350 Alone, the safe harbor provisions of the California Code
extend a limited partner's power to control the enterprise far beyond
the early New York statute and the ULPA.3 5' Section 15632(a) fur-
ther extends the limited partner's power to control."2 Absent provi-
sions to the contrary in the partnership agreement, a limited partner
no longer is forced to rely solely on the managerial skills of others
and may actively protect investments. 35 3
The newly sanctioned powers of control distinguish the limited part-
ner's right from corporate shareholder rights and identify the limited
partner more closely with a general partner. 354 Generally, the limited
partner in California will now have the right to control the enterprise
without fully losing protection from liability. Exercise of some con-
trol will be fully protected from liability by the safe harbor provi-
sions.3" Other types of participation in control will exceed the safe
harbor provisions and result in partial liability. 35 6 Finally, rights of
control may be circumscribed in the partnership agreement. 35 7
Therefore, in California, whether a limited partner can participate
in control of the enterprise is an issue that must be decided on a
case by case basis.358
LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AS SECURITIES
A. The ULPA and RULPA
Since limited partnerships are not listed as securities in either the
348. See Buxbaum, Understanding California's New Limited Partnership Act, CAI. L.
REv. 13, 14 (May 1984).
349. Tort victims are included because the liability provision in the first sentence is not
excepted in the second sentence. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 348, at 13-15.
350. The limited partner remains potentially liable to reliance creditors and tort victims.
See supra notes 347-49 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 260-98 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 346-50 and accompanying text.
353. See generally Buxbaum, supra note 348, at 13-15. See also supra notes 325-50 and
accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 198-240 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 326-43 and accompanying text.
356. Participation in control exposes limited partners to liability to tort victims and reliance
creditors. See supra notes 347-50 and accompanying text.
357. RULPA § 3.02, supra note 3, at 240.
358. See infra note 408 and accompanying text.
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1933 Act or the 1934 Act, deciding whether a limited partnership in-
terest is a security requires application of judicial interpretation." 9
The Howey definition of an investment contract provides the struc-
ture for analyzing partnership interests.360 The first three prongs of
the Howey definition are easily met.36' First, the investor usually will
invest money3 62 in the partnership. Second, the investment involves
a common enterprise.3 63 Third, partnership interests are designed to
return a profit to the investor.316  Therefore, few partnership interests
would not meet the first three prongs of the Howey test.3 6
The fourth prong distinguishes general partnerships from limited
partnerships.366 The fourth prong of Howey requires the investor to
rely solely upon the efforts of others for a return on investment. The
right of a partner to control the enterprise is fundamental to general
partnerships.367 Consequently, general partnerships fail the control
prong of Howey and, therefore, generally are held not to be
securities.368
Limited partnerships under the ULPA and RULPA, however, are
treated differently than general partnerships. Violation of the fourth
prong is almost impossible. Under the ULPA a limited partner would
lose limited status if the partner participated in control of the enter-
prise.3 69 Under RULPA the limited partner can exert a greater amount
of control.370 Limited partners, however, lose limited status if par-
ticipation in control of the enterprise is substantially the same as that
exercised by the general partner.37" ' Therefore, under both the ULPA
and RULPA, a limited partner cannot participate in control of the
business. Consequently, if the interest is a true limited partnership,
359. See supra notes 78-197 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.




365. See Long, supra note 96, at 612. "Classifying a general partnership interest as a security
depends upon the last element of the proposed test, managerial control. The other elements
are clearly present." Id.
366. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 204 & 237-38 and accompanying text.
368. See I H. MARSH & R. VOLC, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURTIS LAWS §
5.11(1) (1985). "In the case of a partnership . . . the legal right of the general partner directly
to exercise control over the operations of the business has been considered to negative the
existence of any security. . . ." Id. See also H. BLOOMENTHALL, supra note 73, at § 2.12 (stating
"[t]he view that general partnership interests are not securities appears now to be well
entrenched.").
369. See supra notes 271-98 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 299-318 and accompanying text.
371. Id.
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and limited partners do not participate in control of the enterprise,
the fourth prong of the Howey test is satisfied because the investor
relies upon the efforts of others for a return on the investment. As
a result, limited partnership interests are generally held to be
securities.372
In addition to the result reached under Howey, the goals of securities
regulation distinguish general partnerships from limited partnerships. 3"
Full disclosure laws protect investors who lack access to information
available to management. In general partnerships, partners can per-
sonally influence the enterprise and obtain all information that would
be available through full disclosure requirements. 7  Therefore, neither
federal nor California case law would support application of securities
law to protect a general partner.3 73 One caveat exists, however. If
the partnership agreement limits the general partner's right to control
the enterprise and access to information, application of securities
regulations would be justified for the same reason that securities law
applies to coroporate shares.37 '
Applying the same policy to limited partnerships results in regulatory
protection for these investments as securities. Since the limited part-
ner cannot protect the investment through participation in manage-
ment, the investor is forced into passivity. 7 When the investor is
passive, full disclosure requirements aid the investor in deciding whether
to buy, hold, or sell.37 Under both the ULPA and the RULPA, the
372. See Long, supra note 96, at 611 (limited partnership interests are always securities);
T. HAzEN, supra note 45, at 22 (limited partnership interest meets the definition of a security);
H. BLoomENTHAL, supra note 73, at § 2.12(2) lirmited partnerships ordinarily meet the investment-
contract approach to securities analysis); H. M~AsH & R. VOLK, supra note 368, at § 5.1112]
(limited partnerships restricting a limited partner's control have always been held securities).
See also Kroungold v. Triester, 407 F. Supp. 414, 416-17 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (sale of a limited
partnership interest in apartment development was sale of an investment contract, and therefore
sale of securities within the meaning of the Securities Act); Murphey v. Hillwood Villa Associates,
411 F. Supp. 287, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (interest of limited partner, who was a party to agree-
ment that enterprise was to be managed wholly by general partners, was investment contract
and therefore security within meaning of the Securities Act).
373. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 203 & 237-38 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 79-197 and accompanying text.
376. See H. MAasH & R. VOLK, supra note 368, at § 5.11(1).
If the actual arrangement is such that persons who are given the legal status of general
partners are nevertheless merely passive investors and the direction and control of
the enterprise is concentrated in the hands of only one or a few of the ostensible
general partners, the interest of the other partners may be a "security" within the
regulatory purpose of the statute.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Long, supra note 96, at 613 (for purposes of securities laws,
little difference exists between a general and limited partnerships if the general partners concen-
trate management in the hands of a few partners through the partnership agreement).
377. See supra notes 274-322 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
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limited partner is a passive investor. 3" Full disclosure laws would pro-
tect the limited partner from fraudulently being induced to invest in
the partnership. As a result, limited partnership interests should be
subject to securities regulation under the policy of protecting passive
investors. 3"
As an economic reality, investment in most limited partnerships is
very similar to purchasing corporate stock."' The limited partner under
the ULPA and RULPA has the ability to transfer the interest in the
enterprise, has the benefit of limited liability, and has limited control
rights."'2 Congress has expressly recognized the need to regulate the
sale of corporate shares.383 Two investments with similar characteristics
should be regulated in the same manner.
Finally, the manner of soliciting investors, as discussed in Joiner,
Howey, Forman, and Marine Bank, is often different for general and
limited partnerships. 3" Promoters will not publicly solicit investors
to become general partners due to the risk to both the original and
prospective partners."' Furthermore, most investors would not have
sufficient time to participate in management. Limited partnerships,
however, tend to attract passive investors.38 6 The investor in a limited
partnership will not be an active participant in the enterprise,38 since
control is limited. Moreover, most investors in limited partnerships
do not desire active involvement. 8 Therefore, promoters are more
likely to publicly solicit investors for limited partnership interests than
a general partnership interest. Public solicitation is another reason
for application of securities regulation to limited partnerships." 9
Therefore, the remedial purposes of securities regulation support the
definition of limited partnership interests formed under the ULPA
or RULPA as securities."' Because legislatures may alter the RULPA,
the limited partnership statute of each state must be examined to deter-
mine whether securities regulations are applicable to limited partner-
ships formed under the laws of the state. The modification made by
379. See supra notes 258-322 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 301-22 and accompanying text.
382. Id.
383. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 115-38 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
386. See L. RtasmN, supra note 241, at § 2.03.
387. See supra notes 274-320 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 301-20 and accompanying text.
389. See supra notes 115-38 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
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the California Legislature of the RULPA has significant impact when
applying securities analysis.
B. California Limited Partnerships
Application of the Howey test to California limited partnerships
can cause a different result than under the ULPA or RULPA. While
the first three prongs of the Howey39' test have the same application
as described above,3 92 the effect of control is altered. The California
version of the RULPA allows the investor to control the business
and maintain status as a limited partner. 393 The absence of control
found critical to the definition of an investment contract in Howey,394
Glenn Turner,395 Park,3 96 Coster,3 97 and Graham,3 98 is allowed under
California Corporations Code section 15632. 3"9 Therefore, the fourth
prong of the Howey test for finding a security is not satisfied.
In addition to the definitional approach of Howey, public policy
reasons for securities regulation preclude the definition of some Califor-
nia limited partnerships as securities. 00 Since the limited partner in
California now may protect an investment through managerial con-
trol,4 ' protection through full disclosure is unnecessary.40 2 Applying
securities regulation would, in essence, disregard the economic realities
of the investment.4 03 Expansion of the limited partner's control
distinguishes limited partners from corporate shareholders.0 4 Limited
partners who control the partnership resemble general partners in a
general partnership. 03
Although the limited partner has the ability to control the enter-
391. The four prongs of the Howey test are (1) an investment of money, (2) presence of
a common enterprise, (3) expectation of profits, and (4) the profits will result solely from the
efforts of others. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99. See also supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 360-65 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 323-58 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 142-64 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 324-54 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 324-54 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 45-74 and accompanying text. See also Long, supra note 96, at 613.
"If a partner is active in the partnership business and shares in management and control, his
interest is not a security. Even registration under the security act could not give him more
complete access to information." Id.
403. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
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prise in California, the right of control can be circumscribed in the
partnership agreement.406 As a result, the limited partnership agree-
ment essentially will determine the necessity for investor protection
through securities regulation and satisfaction of the Howey control
test.4"7 Therefore, courts now must analyze application of securities
regulation to limited partnership interests on a case-by-case basis.408
The recent drafting of two uniform laws raise questions about the
future treatment of limited partnership interests as securities in
California.
FUTURE LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The California Legislature expanded the control rights of limited
partners to control the limited partnership to an extent that alters
the traditional notions of limited partnership interests as securities. 09
Two uniform laws, the 1985 ULPA and 1985 Uniform Securities Act,
that affect securities regulation of limited partnerships have recently
been approved by the National Conference of Commissioners. The
California Legislature should amend the Corporations Code to be con-
sistent with the 1985 ULPA and 1985 Uniform Securities Act.
A. The 1985 ULPA
Based on current partnership law in California, a limited partner
may participate in control of the partnership to a greater degree than
under the RULPA provisions, without losing status as a limited part-
ner. 1' In California, the limited partner's right to control is neither
completely granted, nor completely circumscribed."' Instead, the right
to control exists somewhere in between those two extremes. In Califor-
nia and other states, partnership law is changing from a requirement
of no interference with management to an accommodation of increased
managerial control of the partnership by the limited partner.4" Reduc-
tion of restraints on limited partnership participation continues to be
recommended by the commissioners of the uniform laws.413
406. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15621(a).
407. See Long, supra note 96, at 613.
408. People v. Syde, 37 Cal. 2d 765, 768, 235 P.2d 601, 602-03 (1951). "Whether a par-
ticular instrument is to be considered a security within the meaning of the statute is a question
to be determined in each case." Id.
409. See supra notes 392-408 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 326-58 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 345-57 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 258407 and accompanying text.
413. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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In August 1985, the RULPA was superceded by the 1985 ULPA."'
Section 303(a), the provision relevant to the issue of control, was
significantly modified. The new act relaxed, but did not abolish, the
control rule.4 15 The ambiguous "substantially the same as" test in-
troduced in the RULPA was deleted. 41 6 The second sentence of sec-
tion 303(a) now states that a limited partner who participates in con-
trol of the enterprise is liable only to persons transacting business
with the limited partnership with a reasonable belief, based on the
limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general part-
ner.417 Thus, under the Amended RULPA, only reliance creditors can
sue the limited partner for participation in the enterprise.41 8
The 1985 ULPA reinforces a trend for limited partnerships toward
liberalization of the control rule. 1 9 Many actions by limited partners
that would have resulted in a loss of limited liability under the ULPA
or the RULPA will not result in liability if the limited partnership
is formed in California or under the 1985 ULPA. 2 ° In addition, unlike
414. ULPA §§ 101-1106, supra note 3, at 284-99.
415. Basile, supra note 260, at 1214.
416. Id.
417. The second sentence of the new § 303(a) provides: "However, if the limited partner
participates in the control of the business, he [or she] is liable only to persons who transact
business with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's
conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner." ULPA § 303(a), supra note 3, at 290.
418. See id.
419. See, e.g., TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a, § 8(a) (in Texas a limited partner
who takes part in control of the business is liable only to "a person who transacts business
with the partnership reasonably believing that the limited partner is a general partner"); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-303(a) (Delaware law provides that "if the limited partner does par-
ticipate in the control of the business, he is liable only to persons who transact business with
the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that
the limited partner is a general partner."). See supra notes 323-58 and accompanying text (Califor-
nia law).
420. See Basile, supra note 262, at 1218-19.
Consider the following three hypothetical partnership agreement provisions: (1) a written
partnership agreement for a real estate limited partnership providing that the general
partners may not, without the consent of the holders of two-thirds of the limited
partnership interests, enter into a long-term lease for more than twenty-five percent
of the partnership's rental space; (2) a written partnership agreement providing that
the partnership is to be managed by a committee of three persons who may, but
need not be, partners and further providing that the management committee is to
be elected by vote of all the partners; (3) a written partnership agreement providing
that the general partners may not make any charitable contributions without the con-
sent of the holder of fifty-one percent of the limited partnership interests.
If the limited partners exercised the right to consent or to vote under any of these
provisions, the limited partners literally would be "taking part" or "participating"
in the control of the business and presumptively would incur liability for the partner-
ship's obligations under section 7 of the ULPA or former or new section 303(a) of
the RULPA . . . If the limited partnerships were organized in California, Delaware,
Texas, or a state that adopts new § 303(a), the limited partners would be liable,
if at all, only "to persons who transact business with the limited partnership reasonably
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the California version of the RULPA, the 1985 ULPA protects the
limited partners from potential tort victims. 42' The limited partner
is protected from tort victims because a tort is not "transacting
business" with the limited partnership.
Decreasing restrictions on limited partner control is consistent with
the original philosophy of the ULPA. When the ULPA was drafted
in 1916, the act was drafted in accordance with a basic assumption
regarding control rights of the limited partner.422 The assumption stated
in the Official Comment was:
No public policy requires a person who contributes to the capital
of a business, acquires an interest in the profits, and some degree
of control over the conduct of the business, to become bound for
the obligations of the business; provided creditors have no reason
to believe at the time their credits were extended that such person
was so bound. 413
California followed the assumption of the National Conference of
Commissioners by adopting a version of the RULPA that limits liability
of limited partners to reliance creditors and tort victims. 4 2 4 To be con-
sistent with past legislative action in California, the legislature should
further expand a limited partner's right to control the enterprise by
adopting section 303(a) of the 1985 RULPA.
Expansion of the limited partner's control rights has a substantial
impact on securities analysis. The result is greater reliance on the
Howey test for defining a security through investment contract analysis.
Therefore, determining whether a particular partnership interest is an
investment contract will have to be made on a case-by-case basis. 45
The 1985 Uniform Securities Act provides a solution to the practical
problems of applying the Howey test to limited partnership interests
on a case-by-case basis.
B. The 1985 Uniform Securities Act
Despite the trend to increase the control rights of limited partners,
and a corresponding decrease in the need to protect the active limited
believing, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that the limited partner is a general
partner."
Id. (footnote included).
421. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
422. See Commissioner's Official Comment, ULPA, supra note 3, at 564.
423. Id.
424. See supra notes 323-58 and accompanying text.
425. See supra notes 358 & 408 and accompanying text.
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partner, drafting of the 1985 Uniform Securities Act426 has taken an
unexpected direction. In August of 1985, the 1985 Uniform Securities
Act was adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners and
specifically includes limited partnership interests within the definition
of a security."' Applying securities regulation to an investment that
increasingly provides for investor participation appears to be incon-
sistent. The inclusion of limited partnership interests in the definition
of a security, however, is logical upon a closer examination.
The amendment is logical for two reasons. The first is practical
considerations for the practicing attorneys. Although the limited part-
ner's rights of control have been expanded, the definition of control
remains elusive.4 28 Attempting to apply the definition in order to ad-
vise a client whether a limited partnership is a security could be
extremely difficult. Prior to the California version of the RULPA,
the practitioner could assume that a limited partnership interest was
a security and then comply with the applicable securities regulation.4 9
Currently in California, the attorney must make the very difficult deter-
mination whether the partnership agreement provides the limited part-
ner with enough involvement to preclude a finding of an investment
contract under the Howey test.430
A second reason for defining a limited partnership interest as a
security is the economic reality of the investment in most cases. The
liquidity and limited liability offered by limited partnerships attract
passive investors who need protection through full disclosure laws."3'
As discussed in this comment, however, some limited partners will
be able to protect investments through participation in the enterprise. "32
426. UNUF. SEC. ACT §§ 101-807, 7B U.L.A. 16-51 (West Supp. 1986) [hereinafter cited
as Securities Act].
427. Id. § 101(18), supra note 426, at 19.
428. See Basile, supra note 262, at 1221.
Both academicians and practitioners have bemoaned the control rule's uncertainty.
Professor Alan Feld has observed that "[tihe control test . . . presents substantial
interpretive problems in cases falling between the extreme of the wholly passive in-
vestor and the partner who manages the business on a day-to-day basis." Messrs.
George Coleman and David Weatherbie of the Texas bar have stated that in their
experience "[p]robably the most serious problem encountered in drafting and carry-
ing out a limited partnerhsip agreement is that of determining what constitutes taking
part 'in the control of the busines' of a limited partnership . . . . [S]ome recent
cases in attempting to solve the issue have only made it worse."
Id. (quoting Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HAiv. L. Rnv. 1471, 1473
(1969) and Coleman & Weatherbie, Special Problems in Limited Partnership Planning, 30 Sw.
L.J. 887, 897 (1976)).
429. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
430. Cf. Long, supra note 96, at 610-13 (the partnership agreement can expand manage-
ment rights, and therefore, there is "no need for the protection of the securities act").
431. See supra notes 319-22 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 323-58 and accompanying text.
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As a result of the increased control rights of the limited partner,
a limited partnership interest is analogous to shares in a closely held
corporation. A limited partner, like a corporate shareholder, enjoys
the advantages of limited liability and liquidity."" A limited partner,
like a corporate shareholder, can now participate in control of the
enterprise without losing limited liability.434 In closely held corpora-
tions most investors participate in control of the enterprise." Despite
the shareholder's participation, the interest owned by the investor is
still a security. 36 However, while the interest is defined as a security,
society recognizes the investor in a closely held corporation does not
need protection through full disclosure laws. 37 Therefore, state4 38 and
federal439 statutes provide an exemption from registration and qualifica-
tion if the transaction meets certain requirements.
To be exempted from securities registration and qualification in
California, an investment must be offered to fewer than thirty-five
persons.44 0 Additionally, the prospective investors must have either
a preexisting relationship with the offeror, or have a substantial degree
of personal business sophistication or be represented by a professional
investment advisor.44' Finally, the sale cannot be accomplished through
public advertising. 4 2 The goal of registration and merit requirements
is to protect ignorant investors. 4 3 When an investment transaction
is exempt from securities registration, the investor has enough
knowledge, information, and personal involvement to decrease the need
of regulatory protection.44
Thus, through securities regulation society recognizes most corporate
shareholders will be passive investors and therefore need protection.
Additionally, society recognizes that some corporate shareholders will
be actively involved in controlling the corporation and, therefore,
registration requirements would be of little value. Hence, some trans-
433. See supra notes 301-22 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 324-58 and accompanying text.
435. H. HEN, supra note 3, at 696.
436. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15631.
437. See Long, supra note 96, at 613.
438. See infra notes 440-44 and accompanying text.
439. Rule 505 exempts securities from registration when no more than 35 unaccredited per-
sons purchase the share from the issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1985). See also supra note 75
and accompanying text.
440. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(f)(1).
441. Id. § 25102(f)(2).
442. Id. § 25102(f)(4).
443. See supra notes 46-74 and accompanying text.
444. See supra note 441 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 245-46 and accom-
panying text.
1986 / Limited Partnerships as Securities
actions involving the sale of stock are entitled to registration
exemptions.
As a result of the similarities between limited partnership interests
and corporate stock, California should follow the 1985 Uniform
Securities Act by including limited partnership interests within the
definition of a security in the Corporations Code. By defining a limited
partnership interest as a security, California will be able to protect
passive investors, allow exemptions for investors not needing protec-
tion, and provide greater certainty of securities regulation for
practitioners.
CONCLUSION
Protection of ignorant investors is the goal of securities regulation.
Federal securities laws seek to achieve this goal by requiring full
disclosure of information regarding the investment. Under securities
laws, full disclosure is required upon solicitation of investors and
throughout the life of the enterprise. California securities laws pro-
tect ignorant investors by requiring the investment to meet the fair,
just, and equitable standard. When an investment scheme is not
specifically listed in a securities statute the scheme may nonetheless
meet the definition based upon an investment contract definition. The
Howey case provides a definition of investment contract that is applied
in both federal and California courts. The Howey definition establishes
four factors for finding an investment contract, the most crucial be-
ing reliance upon the efforts of others. If investors are allowed to
participate in control of an enterprise, the investment fails the Howey
test and therefore is not a security.
Traditionally, limited partners have not possessed the right to par-
ticipate in management of the partnership. Beginning with the RULPA,
however, a trend toward relaxing the control rule has developed. The
RULPA started the trend by establishing safe harbor provisions and
introducing the "substantially the same" test. California further
expanded protection of limited partner control by limiting liability
to reliance creditors and tort victims. Compared to previous statutes,
the California Corporations Code now allows limited partners signifi-
cant ability to participate in management.
Because of the historical inability of limited partners to participate
in management, limited partnership interests have traditionally been
treated as securities. Limited partnerships satisfied the Howey test of
an investment contract as being, (1) an investment of money, (2) in
a common enterprise, (3) for profit, and (4) reliance upon the efforts
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of others for a return on investment. Increased control rights of limited
partners, however, allow the limited partnership interest to fail the
Howey test. In addition, since the rights may be circumscribed by
the partnership agreement, practitioners cannot automatically treat
limited partnership interests as meeting, or failing to meet, the defini-
tion of a security. Instead, whether a limited partnership interest is
a security must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Recent additions of the 1985 ULPA and the 1985 Uniform Securities
Act illustrate an apparent inconsistency in the law. The 1985 ULPA
seeks to expand limited partner control. The 1985 Uniform Securities
Act seeks to formally recognize limited partnership interests as
securities. Analyzing the economic realities of the limited partnership,
as well as public policy behind securities regulation, can harmonize
the two Acts.
Public policy seeks to protect investors from making investment
decisions without the necessary information. Investors who participate
in management of an enterprise have access to the necessary infor-
mation and do not need disclosure and merit laws. Some limited part-
ners will be active and not need regulatory protection. The economic
realities of limited partnerships, however, indicate that most limited
partners will be passive, since limited partnerships attract passive in-
vestors. Therefore, as with corporate shares, limited partnership in-
terests should be treated as securities and should include exemption
provisions for situations when the investor is likely to be self protected.
The practitioner must carefully consider the control issues, for both
limited partner liability and securities regulation purposes, under cur-
rent California law. The 1985 ULPA and the 1985 Uniform Securities
Act are a standing recommendation to California. The California
Legislature should eliminate the partnership law-securities law tug-of-
war by amending the Corporations Code to include provisions con-
sistent with the 1985 ULPA and 1985 Uniform Securities Act.
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